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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, the land installment contract has become 
increasingly popular in Iowa as a means of financing the purchase of farm 
land. Today it is more connnonly used than is the traditional mortgage. As 
a method of low equity financing of farm land, it has filled an important 
gap that the mortgage could not fill. Previous studies, as well as the 
nature of the land contract, suggest that it has often enabled farmers to 
become owner-operators earlier than they otherwise could have. In so 
doing, it has contributed to the goal of land ownership for farmers as the 
Homestead Act did after its passage in 1862, and as the Federal Farm Loan 
Act of 1916 and the Farmers Home Administration Act of 1946 have done in 
more recent times. 
Present trends in Iowa agriculture suggest that the land installment 
contract will continue and perhaps expand its role as a method of financ-
ing the purchase of farm land. However, rapid changes in the agricultural 
sector since 1972 raise serious questions about the eficacy of land instal-
lment contracts in the future. This study examines some of these questions 
which relate to the economic implications of land installment contracts for 
low equity buyers in their efforts to achieve land ownership. 
Nature of the Land Installn:ent Contract 
The land installment contract (hereafter referred to as land contract) 
differs in several respects from the mortgage. The land contract is 
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finance d by the seller of the land, while the mortgage is usually financed 
by a third party as shown in Table I-1. The down payment for a mortgage 
is usually greater than that for the land contract a ccording to the data 
in Table 1-1, especially when mortgages held by sellers, the Farmers Home 
Administration, and "others" are not considered. The down payment with a 
contract usually is less than thirty percent of the purchase price which 
is motivated in part by the impact of Federal tax regulations on the seller 
and in part by the limited down payment ability of the buyer. 
Table I-1 . Financing of land transfers in the United States in 1973a 
Lender 
Land Contract by Seller 
Mortgage by Seller 
Mortgage by Other In di vi dual 
Mortgage by Commercial Bank 
Mortgage by Insurance Company 
Mortgage by Federal Bank 
Mortgage by Farmers Home 
Administration 
Mortgage by Others 
asource: (49, p. 6) . 
Percentage of land Debt-to-Price 
transfers financed ratio 
27 . 6 73.8 
13 . 3 74.4 
3 .0 66.4 
10.1 67 . 4 
9.8 64 . 3 
28.4 72. 3 
3.9 87.0 
3 .9 80 . 3 
The greatest difference between the mortgage and the land contract arises 
f rom a legal concept. Associated with land ownership are two elements: 
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beneficial interest and security interest. The beneficial interest in 
land entitles the buyer to the income produced by the land and the right 
to proceed towards full ownership (25, p. 11). The security interest gives 
the seller or financing party a reasonable assurance the the principal to 
be amortized, as well as the interest on the principal, will be paid (25, 
p . 11). With a mortgage, the legal title is passed to the buyer and the 
security interest of the seller or other lender is guaranteed by a mort-
gagee ' s "lien" on the land (3, p. 88). The land contract leaves the legal 
title with the seller to guarantee his security interest, but protects the 
beneficial interest of the buyer by a contract requiring the seller to 
convey the legal title to the buyer when the terms as stated in the con-
tract have been f ulfilled (25, p. 13). 
Enforcement of the financing party ' s rights varies greatly between 
the two instruments . Under Iowa law, the buyer's interest in land bought 
by land contract is forfeited thirty days after the seller serves notice 
that the terms of the contract have been broken (25, p. 51) . Unless the 
buyer fulfills the defaulted contract terms within those thirty days after 
the seller's notification, he loses his entire interest in the land (25, 
p . 51) . Iowa law regarding defaulted mortgage payments, including princi-
pal and interest, requires the lender to initiate a judicial proceeding 
called foreclosure by judicial sale in order to get the payments due to 
him \.lllder the terms of the mortgage (25, p. 46). If the court finds that 
the mortgage provisions have been defaulted upon by the buyer, it directs 
that the land be sold to pay the unpaid principal, and the costs of the 
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foreclosure proceeding (25, p. 46). Once this has been done, the mortgage 
buyer is allowed one year by Iowa law in which to pay the amount found due 
by the court (25, p. 47). If after this period, the mortgage buyer has 
not made payment to the lender, the land is sold by judicial sale and both 
parties n o longer have any rights in the land unless one party purchases 
the land at the sale (25, p. 47). If the proceeds from the sale of the 
land by judicial sale exceed the amount due to the lender, the residual is 
granted to the mortgage buyer (25, p. 47). The results of the differing 
enforcement procedures are that: 1) the seller may proceed more quickly 
and cheaply in the case of a defaulted land contract than a lender can in 
the case of a defaulted mortgage, and (2) the buyer loses all his interest 
in the land when he forfeits a land contract, no matter how much principal 
has been aroortized. However, under a mortgage the buyer is entitled to 
the residual remaining after the seller's claims against the land have been 
satisfied . 
The land contract may contain clauses pertaining to the rights and 
obligations of the buyer and seller while the contract is in force which 
would not be found in a mortgage. Such clauses are included at the option 
of the buyer and seller in order t o further define or protect their respec-
tive interests in the land. The seller's security interest may be further 
protected by requiring the buyer t o insure the buildings on the land, for-
bidding the buyer from altering, removing, or selling existing buildings, 
and giving the seller the right to inspect the property or participate in 
its management (9, pp. 56, 68, 62). These provisions protecting the 
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seller's security interest under a land contract may substitute for the 
protection provided by _ the buyer's higher equity in the land under a mort-
gage . Provisions in the contract that lengthen the statutory period of 
grace during which the buyer may correct de faul ted contract terms after 
receipt of the seller's notice or allow the contract to be replaced by a 
mortgage after a speci fied portion of the principal has been paid give 
added protection to the buyer's beneficial interest (9, pp. 71-76, 85-89) . 
Such provisions may effectively substitute for the increased protection 
provided to the buyer on a mortgage by the foreclosure regulations. 
Use of Land Contracts in Iowa 
Although the land contract was used for farm land transfers in Iowa 
since its settlement, it wasn't until after World War II that its use began 
to expand . Table I-2 shows the rapid growth of land contract use since 
that time. In the late 1940's, land contracts were used in seven percent 
of the farm land transfers that were financed. Use grew rapidly during 
the 19SO's reaching forty-two percent of financed land transfers in 1960. 
The data for the 1960's show contract usage gradually increasing reaching 
a high of 65 percent in 1971. 
Possible Explanations for Increasing Use of Land Contracts 
Various reasons have been cited for the increasing popularity of land 
contracts. A survey of Iowa land contract buyers in 1956 found that the 
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reason for using the land contract was lack of cash for a higher down 
payment in forty percent of the cases, the seller wanting the tax advan-
tages of sale by land contract in twenty-one percent of the cases, and 
a combination of the two preceding factors in six percent of the cases 
(9, p. 15) . Constantly rising farm land prices since that time would 
suggest that these two reasons have continued in importance . 
Increasing farm land prices with the same fixed percentage down 
payment would make the actual down payment parallel the change in land 
prices. Also contributing to the increase in size of down payment is 
the trend towards larger farm units in terms of acreage. Substitution 
of capital for labor and intensified use of ·non-farm produced inputs would 
contribute to increased use of land contracts by reducing the amount of 
cash that a buyer could conunit to land resources. 
The continual rise in farm land prices also implies that sellers 
realize increased capital gains associated with selling their farm land. 
Federal tax law allows sellers to pay taxes only on that proportion of 
the capital gain received in a given year if no more than thirty percent 
of the purchase price is received in any given year (SO, pp. 4S-46). Tax 
regulations require that the entire capital gain is subject to taxes if 
more than thir ty percent of the purchase price is received in a year (SO, 
pp. 45-46). This suggests that with increased capital gains, the potential 
tax savings associated with land contract sales have also increased. Work-
ing against increased seller use might be the increased overall rate of 
price inflation in recent years. The land contract converts an asset that 
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Table I-2. Use of land contracts in Iowa, 1946-1973 
Year(s) 
1946-1949 
1950-1954 
1955-1959 
1960 
Percentage of financed 
farm land trans fers by 
contrac ta 
7 
11 
21 
42 
Percentage of all farm 
land transfers by 
contractb 
1962 39 
1963 36 
1964 38 
1965 42 
1966 44 
1967 52 
1968 47 
1969 48 
1970 60 
1971 65 
1972 56 
1973 58 
aFor the period 1946 to 1960 inclusive: (6, p. 31). 
bFor the period 1962 to 1973, inclusive: (19). 
coata not available. 
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has a favorable growth in value over the past decade (11) into a fixed 
annuity whose purchasing power declines over time if combined with price 
inflation (14) . 
Questions Raised by Increased Use of Land Contracts 
The nature of the land contract may well increase the amount of risk 
faced by both the b uyer and the seller. The buyer typically has less t ime 
to meet the requirements of the contract before the seller can take action 
which would erase all of his equity in the land if he is unable to meet 
the con tract terms. This increased risk, as well as other aspec ts of the 
cont ract, have far - reaching economic consequences for the buyer, especially 
the l ow-equity buyer . The land contract imposes an annual fixed cost which 
must be met in order to retain the right to use the land . It may affect 
acquisi tion of variable inputs investment in intermediate term assets such 
as machinery and buildings . It may also affect the availability of credit, 
and thus have an additional impact on investment decisions . In turn, the 
type and level of investment, as well as the risk involved, may affect en-
terprise selection. This may determine annual income from which the fixed 
cost of land ownership as well as other financial obligations must be paid. 
These i n terrela t ionships raise serious questions in light of rapidly 
increasing land prices, changes in the size of farm operating units, changes 
in resource use, increasing farm costs, and high commodity prices in 1972, 
1973 , and 1974. Are traditional land contract terms still adequate to 
assure t hat the buyer can successfully complete the terms of the land 
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contract without undue hardship? What amount of equity is necessary to 
insure ownership success of the buyer? Can the land contract still serve 
the needs of low-equity farmers? Most importantly, the importance of land 
con trac t usage s ugges ts that an examination of alternative contract terms 
be made to find those combinations of terms which can increase the buyer's 
chances of successfully completing the terms of the contract. Answers to 
these questions contribute to answering the larger question of what the 
future ownership structure of Iowa agriculture will be. 
While the discussion has focused on the buyer ' s side of the problem, 
the ques t ions raised have important implications to sellers. A buyer who 
defaults necessarily involves a seller, and in many cases the seller is 
depending on the contract payments as a major source of retirement inco~. 
Objectives of the Study 
In proceeding with this study, the following objectives will be 
pursued: 
1. The use of land contracts will be examined on an ex ante basis to 
discover success and failure elements as experienced by low-equity land 
buyers. 
2 . A farm firm growth model will be developed in order to conduct 
the analysis. 
3. Suggestions will be made to improve the use of land contracts by 
low-equi ty farmers . 
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4. Suggestions will be made for further research into the use of land 
contracts by low-equity farmers. 
Organization of the Report 
This report will proceed in the following manner. In Chapter II, the 
problem is discussed in more detail. The method of analysis is described 
in Chapter III . Chapter IV describes the dynamic linear programming model 
that will be used in this study. The model is applied to a farm synthesiz-
ing a typical farm in north-central Iowa that might be bought on contract 
by a low-equity farmer. The assumptions made concerning the model, its 
structure, and the parameters within it are specified. The production 
organization of the firm that is obtained by solving the model under dif-
ferent sets of conditions is discussed in Chapter V. Chapter VI analyzes 
the impact of different beginning equity levels on the representative farm 
firm. The effects of different sets of the contract terms is discussed in 
Chapter VII. Chapter VIII compares the firm's ability to meet its financial 
obligations under two different sets of prices. The concluding chapter 
reviews and summarizes the study in terms of the objectives that were pre-
viously stated . 
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CHAPTER II. FORMULATION OF PROBLEMS INHERENT 
IN LAND CONTRACT USE 
Goals of Land Installment Contract Buyers 
The land contract may be a means to achieve several goals of land 
contract buyers. Ownership of land as opposed to tenancy eliminates several 
sources of uncertainty for the firm. Because of the speed with which many 
contracts can be forfeited, these sources of uncertainty are not reduced 
as much as when the land is mortgaged or owned outright. Since land is 
the major input in crop production, ownership guarantees the continuity of 
the firm and future employment of the firm's other resources. A 1956 study 
of land contract buyers found that: "In many cases the impression was 
strong that the buyer was forced into purchasing a farm by economic neces-
s ity. The tenant farmer who could not renew his lease or obtain another 
tenancy either bought a farm or quit farming" (9, p . 11). 
Ownership of land also reduces uncertainty of expectations which 
typically arises in leasing situations. Because of short term leases and 
uncertainty with respect to the landlord's retirement or death, the plan-
ning horizon faced by the firm is less than the payback period for most 
profitable investments . Investments such as drainage systems, buildings, 
and other livestock facilities require payoff periods of several years. 
Such investments may be very profitable for a farmer who owns his land, 
but not for the tenant who has insecure occupancy on the land. 
Land ownership also reduces operating leverage, the amount of fixed 
costs that the firm must pay each year, from what it would be in a rental 
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situation, especially a cash rental situation. The contract terms will 
determine the magnitude of the fixed costs and whether they change during 
the life of the contract. The level of fixed financial charges is 
increased while the contract is in effect . If the contract has decreasing 
annual payments, at some point financial risk will be reduced below what 
it would be if land were rented. Land ownership via the contract does not 
reduce financial risk initially because it increases financial leverage. 
Thus the benefit of reduced financial risk is not realized until some future 
time. 
Another benefit of land ownership is that it augments the amount of 
credit available to the firm. Baker argues, "Using modifications already 
suggested in optimizing criteria in production organization, it is not dif-
ficult t o demonstrate that a farmer dependent on credit, either directly 
(by borrowing) or indirectly (for a source of liquidity) may be well advised 
to use some of his scarce resources to finance the purchase of land instead 
of leasing land" (1, p. 1568). However, he then goes on to point out that, 
"Preliminary research at the University of Illinois suggests that equity 
acquired with a land purchase contract generates little or no credit that 
can be used for non-real estate borrowing" (1, p. 1568). As in the last 
case, this benefit accrues in the future when the contract is paid off or 
conve rted to a mortgage. 
Aside from these advantages for the firm, land ownership may also 
provide more direct benefits to the owner. First, it provides an attrac-
tive asset in which to invest his savings. It is an asset over which he 
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will have control and with which he is familiar. Furthermore, as pointed 
out in Chapter I, land has had a favorable record of earnings and growth 
in value during the past decade. Land ownership may also provide psychic 
benefits s uch as a sense of goal accomplishment or status in the community. 
All of these benefits may be goals which the contract buyer hopes to 
achieve. Some of these goals, those relating to the firm, are means to 
achieving higher goals. The relative importance of each will differ in 
each individual case . The combination of these goals may motivate an 
individual to buy land on contract. 
Economic Trends Relevant to the Performance of Land Contracts 
Four economic trends have important implications for the future use 
of land contracts in Iowa. These trends relate to farm land prices, size 
of operating units, changes in relative resource use, and farm costs. 
The trends will be discussed in this section. Later in this chapter, their 
implications for the future use of land contracts in Iowa will be discus-
sed i n the section en titled "The Future for Land Contracts." 
Land prices 
The value of Iowa farm land as reflected by its market price has 
risen cons is ten tly during the past decade, and dramatically in the past few 
years. Table II-1 shows this trend for the state average. The row entitled 
"Land Value Per Acre" in Table II-2 shows this trend in central Iowa. In 
some areas of the state, average farm land values now exceed $1,000 per 
acre. 
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Table 11-1. Average Iowa farm land prices, 1960-1974 
Year Value Per Acre 
1960a 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964b 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974c 
aFor the period 1960 through 1963 inclusive: 
bFor the period 1964 through 1973 inclusive: 
cFor 1974: (23, p. 22). 
(dollars) 
237 
237 
241 
250 
265 
293 
331 
362 
375 
382 
385 
395 
440 
579 
756 
(24, pp. 3-4) . 
(33). 
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There are a number of explanatory variables for the changes in farm 
land values, and their relative importance varies from year to year. An 
annual survey of Iowa real estate brokers has recorded these variables 
and their relative importance (27, pp. 3-4; 8, pp. 3-4; 24, pp. 3-4; 10, 
pp. 3-4; 26, pp. 7-8; 7, pp. 3-4; 28, pp. 3-6; 29, pp. 3-6; 30, pp. 7-9; 
31; 32; 33; 23, p. 22). For the years shown in Table II-1, the most im-
portant variables contributing to price increases were the pressure for 
farm enlargement, increased use of land contracts, and scarcity of list-
ings. Important factors that worked against land price increases were the 
cost-price squeeze of the late 1960's which caused net incomes to decline, 
increasing property taxes, and shortages of funds with which to make the 
necessary down payment. Favorable crop harvests, high commodity prices, 
and easy credit conditions in certain years contributed to land price 
increases while the reversal of these factors in other years worked against 
price increases. 
Size of operating units 
In terms of acreage, the average size of Iowa farms has been 
increasing. Table II-3 shows this for the entire state, while the row 
entitled "Acres Per Farm" in Table II-2 shows this for central Iowa in 
several years. In terms of the amount of labor used on farms, there has 
been a decline as shown in the "Labor" row in Table II-2. However, since 
1970 this decline has halted and labor use has increased slightly. 
The size of farms in Iowa has also increased in terms of the dollar 
value of assets for the average farm. Part of this increase is due to 
Table 11-2. Changes in farm business structure in Central Iowa, 1950-1973 
Acres Per Farm 
Labor (months) 
Livestock & Feed 
Machinery & Equipment 
Land & Buildings 
Total Assets 
Land Value Per Acre 
Operating Expenses 
Fixed Expenses 
Total Expenses 
Op. Expenses divided 
by Total Expenses 
Fixed Expenses divided 
by Total Expenses 
Net Farm Income 
Management Return 
Net Farm Income Per Acre 
Crop Acres Per Man 
Power & Equipment Cost 
Per Acre 
Gross Profit Per Acre 
Gross Profit Per Man 
Gross Profits Per $100 
Invested 
1950 
260 
22 
$16, 854 
$ 7,090 
$37,573 
$61,517 
$ 144 
$ 5,500 
$ 1,513 
$ 7 ,013 
.78 
.22 
$13,653 
$ 8,700 
$ 52 
116 
$16. 71 
$ 86 
$12 ,211 
$ 46 
1960 
224 
15 
$17 ,281 
$ 6,658 
$74,600 
$98 ,539 
$ 333 
$ 5,134 
$ 4 ,171 
$ 9, 305 
.55 
.45 
$ 9,489 
$ 3,142 
$ 42 
172 
$20.00 
$ 84 
$14, 915 
$ 19 
Years a 
1964 
261 
15. 7 
$25,441 
$ 9,468 
$92 ,601 
$12 7 ,510 
$ 355 
$ 7,730 
$ 6, 311 
$14,041 
.55 
.45 
$12, 321 
$ 4 ,515 
$ 4 7 
199 
$23. 71 
$ 99 
$19,689 
$ 20 
asources: 1950--(40); 1960--(41); 1964--(42); 1970 and 1973--(43). 
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1950 as % 1960 as % 1970 as % 
1970 1973 of 1973 of 1973 of 1973 
281 312 83 71 90 
13.5 15 147 100 90 
$36,041 $65,225 26 27 55 
$13, 394 $17,062 41 39 78 
$142,100 $218,788 17 34 65 
$191,531 $301,075 20 33 64 
$ 506 $ 701 21 47 72 
$12,729 $19 ,551 28 26 65 
$10, 904 $14, 708 10 28 74 
$$23,633 $34,259 20 27 69 
.53 . 57 136 96 92 
.47 .43 51 104 109 
$61, 228 $61,228 22 15 20 
$-2' 795 $34,458 25 9 7 
$ 45 $ 196 27 21 23 
249 235 49 73 106 
$32.06 $46. 93 36 43 68 
$ 130 $ 245 35 34 53 
$32,359 $76,390 16 20 42 
$ 19 $ 32 143 59 59 
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Table II-3 . Number and average size of farms in Iowa, 1957-1974a 
Year Number of Farms Average Size 
(acres) 
1957 191,000 182 
1958 189,000 184 
1959 187 ,000 186 
1960 183,000 190 
1961 178,000 195 
1962 172 ,000 202 
1963 16 7 ,000 207 
1964 162,000 214 
1965 158,000 219 
1966 155,000 223 
1967 152,000 227 
1968 149,000 231 
1969 14 7 ,000 234 
1970 145,000 237 
1971 143 ,000 241 
1972 141,000 243 
1973 139 ,000 247 
1974 137,000 250 
a(l6) . 
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increases in the physical stock and part of it is due to price inflation 
of the assets. Table II-2 shows the changes for livestock and feed, 
machinery and equipment, land and buildings, and total assets for an aver-
age farm in central Iowa in the years 1950, 1960, 1964, 1970, and 1973. 
The values consistently increased with the exception of the value of machin-
ery and equipment between 1950 and 1960. Much of the increase of value in 
each category occurred between 1970 and 1973. This is not surprising since 
land values increased rapidly in those years, farm commodity prices rose 
sharply in 1972 and 1973, and general price inflation for non-farm pro-
duced inputs was significant in those years. 
Relative changes in resource use 
Changes in relative resource use and productivity between 1950 and 
1973 for central Iowa farms are also shown in Table II-2. The changes in 
magnitudes of resource use during this period have already been discussed. 
Crop acres per man more than doubled in this period. Power and equipment 
costs per acre nearly doubled in this period. While less than half the 
labor that was used in 1950 was used on an acre in 1970, almost double the 
capital in the form of machinery and equipment costs was used. 
The combination of increased use of capital and land and decreased use 
of labor was caused by and affected several aspects of the average business 
as can be seen in Table II-2. Net farm income per acre declined, but the 
increase in the land base partially offset the impact of this on net farm 
income . In terms of changes in productivity of resources during this 
period, gross profits per acre increased, gross profits per man rapidly 
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decreased between 1950 and 1960 and then leveled off. The substitution of 
capital for labor on an increasing land base increased land and labor pro-
ductivity and initially de creased capital productivity. 
For Iowa and the other Corn Belt states, indexes of productivity 
increased during the 1950's, 1960 1 s and into the 1970's. Farm production 
per hour increased the most during this period (47, p. 28). Crop produc-
tion per acre also made significant increases during this period (47, 
p. 11). Output per unit of input rose consistently until 1965 after which 
it fluctuated up and down from year to year. It was above the 1967 level 
only in 1971 and 1972 (47, p. 31). Technological change combined with 
changes in resource use caused these measures of productivity to increase. 
Farm costs 
Operating and fixed expenses increased for farms in central Iowa from 
1950 to 1973 as shown by Table II-2. Furthermore, between 1950 and 1960 
the relative magnitude of the two categories changed. Fixed expenses in-
creased from 22 percent to 45 percent of total expenses and remained near 
this level through the 1960's and early 1970's. The implication of this 
is that operating leverage increased, and with it financial risk for some 
farmers. 
Between 1960 and 1971, the quantity of farm produced inputs used 
increased approximately 30 percent, the price paid for them rose 20 percent, 
and the total expenditures rose 60 percent. During the same years, the 
quantity of non-farm produced inputs used increased about 4 percent, the 
price paid for them rose 45 percent, and total expenditures rose 50 percent 
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(48, p . 8). The rate of price increase for physical inputs during the 
1960's was modest compared to the changes in 1972 and 1973. The "Prices 
Paid by Farmers" index with 1910-1914 as the base of 100 increased from 
410 i n 1971, to 432 in 1972, and to 496 in 1973 (46, p . 8). 
Price s received by Iowa farmers during this same period did not follow 
the same pattern of change. Instead, commodity prices fluctuated, but 
showed no sharp trend during the 1960's . Starting in 1970, there was an 
upward trend culminating in sharp increases in 1973 (46, pp. 6-7). 
The result of the price and cost trends was that during most of the 
1960's Iowa fa rmers were caught in a price-cost squeeze. Increases in 
productivi t y partially offset the results of it. Table II-2 shows that 
ne t income did not increase significantly during this period. Return to 
management was negative in 1970. The 1973 values for both of these were 
many times larger than the 1970 values due to the high commodity prices 
received in that year. 
Impact of Land Contract Terms on the Farm Business 
The proportion of the purchase price paid down, the length of the 
amortization period, and the plan of amortization will affect the buyer's 
business in a number of ways. The size of the annual payment is a func-
tion of all three as is the total amount of interest paid. The amount of 
capital available to the firm in the first year depends upon the size of 
the down payment, and the amount available in subsequent years depends 
upon the size of the annual payments. The down payment and annual payments 
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affect the level of credit availability. Finally, the amount of interest 
paid affects future income tax liabilities since interest is deductible 
from income subject to taxes. 
As the proportion of the purchase price paid down decreases, the size 
of the annual payments and the amount of interest paid increase. This 
creates a tradeoff for the buyer between the size of down payment and 
annual payments. Involved in this tradeoff are rising interest costs as 
the size of the down payment decreases. The buyer may also reduce his 
potential loss from default in the first few years by decreasing the down 
payment, while possibly increasing his chance of default because of higher 
annual payments . The following example shows the impact of changing the 
size of the down payment. The buyer pays $1,000 with terms of 7 percent 
interest, 20 years of amortization, and amortization on the Standard Plan. 
With a 15 percent down payment the annual payments would be $80. Annual 
payments would be $75 if he paid 20 percent down. 
Increasing the length of the amortization period decreases the size 
of the annual payments and increases the total amount of interest paid. 
By doing this the buyer lessens his potential loss from default in every 
year , and probably .je;creases his chance o:Z default. He also pays more 
interest. This relationship can be illustrated with the example of the 
previous paragraph by holding the down payment constant at 15 percent. 
With amortization for twenty years, the annual payment is $80 . It is 
decreased to $73 if the amortization lasts for twenty-five years. 
Many plans exist for amortizing the principal. Three are shown in 
Figure II- 1. The Springfield Plan which is the most widely used in Iowa 
Size of 
Annual 
Payment 
Size of 
Annual 
Payment 
Size of 
Annual 
Payment 
Interest 
Springfield Plan 
Interest 
Standard Plan 
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Principal 
Principal 
Principal 
Increasing Payment Plan 
Figure II-1. Amortization Plans. 
Time 
Time 
Time 
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consists of equal annual principal payments with annual interest on the 
unpaid balance. The total annual paymen t declines with time. The total 
interest paid on this plan is less than for the other two plans. The 
Standard Plan has equal annual payments consisting of interest and princi-
pal. Interest is the largest component of the payment in the first years, 
but it declines as the principal payments decrease the unpaid balance, and 
thus the principal payments increase in each year. The total interest 
paid is less than that paid for an Increasing Payment Plan. The Increas-
ing Payment Plan is similar to the Standard Plan except that the annual 
payment increases with time. The interest component declines more slowly, 
and the principal payments increase at a faster rate than with the Standard 
Plan . Using the previous example with a twenty year term and a 15 percent 
down payment, the annual payment in the first year would be $102 on the 
Springfield Plan, $80 on the Standard Plan and $68 on an Increasing Pay-
ment Plan where payments of principal increase by 40 percent of the first 
year's principal payment in each year. 
The combination of land contract terms also affect the amount of 
credit available to the buyer from othe r sources . First, the equity a 
buyer has in land bought on contract is not desirable collateral since the 
equity can be forfeited easily and quickly to the seller if the buyer de-
faul ts on the terms. Second, the annual payments required by the contract 
constitute a prior claim on the repayment capacity of the firm. The 
higher the payments, the less repayment capacity that is left for repay-
ment of loans for other assets, especially loans for assets that are not 
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self-liquidating. A study done at the University of Illinois in 1968 
investigated the reaction of non-real estate lenders to a simulated loan 
request from a low-equity land contract buyer (36, pp. 1-6). All factors 
except the contract terms were kept constant. In general, the lenders re-
acted most favorably to a situation where the applicant had paid 29 per-
cent down with amortization on the Standard Plan for twenty years. The 
second most favorable situation was with a 29 percent down payment, 
amortization on the Springfield Plan for 10 years, and a balloon payment 
of 50 percent of the principal. Next favorable was a situation with a 20 
percent down payment and repayment in twenty years on the Springfield Plan. 
The least desirable situation was with a 29 percent down payment to be paid 
in 10 years on the Springfield Plan. These preferences seem to indicate 
that lenders are most affected by the size of the annual payments. 
The interest paid on the contract is deducted from the income subject 
to income taxes. The principal paid is not deducted. If the firm is earn-
ing income subject to taxes the impact is to reduce the cost of interest 
on the contract and to increase the amount of before-tax earnings needed 
to pay the principal. 
The impact of these tax issues is that the package of contract terms 
will affect the income tax liability in each of the years and that the tax 
liability will affect the amount of before-tax profits that must be gener-
ated in order to pay the interest and principal on the land contract. 
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Performance of Land Contracts, 1951-1969 
During the past twenty years, the performance of land contracts, in 
terms of facilitating the transfer of f arm land from sellers to buyers, 
appears to have been satisfactory. Their use has greatly increased during 
this time, and there is no evidence of widespread forfeitures. A sample 
of 154 Iowa land contracts that were entered into between 1951 and 1956 
was analyzed twice, in 1962 and 1969. The 1962 study found that of this 
group, 51.9 percent were still paying on the contract, 22.1 percent had 
refinanced the contract, 9.7 percent had paid the contract in full, 14.3 
percent had sold their interest in the contract, and 1.9 percent could not 
be found (34, p. 29). There were no forfeitures, although it is possible 
that the buyers who could not be located might have forfeited. Of those 
who sold, 36.4 percent, or 5.2 percent of the total sample were forced to 
sell because of poor management, too many expenses, or losses in other 
businesses (34, p. 31). By 1969, 20.8 percent of the sample had paid the 
contract in full, 30.5 had refinanced, 14.9 percent were still paying, 
and 33.8 percent had sold their interest in the contract or the farm, or 
could not be found. 1 The 1962 study could find no differences in the con-
tract terms among those forced to sell, those who sold, and the whole 
sample to explain being forced to sell (34, p. 32). 
1n. Panagides, Economics Dept., Iowa State University. Unpublished 
data, 1969. 
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Table II-4 shows some indicators of the financial progress of the 
contract buyers in the sample . The average assets per farm i ncreased 
between the different surveys, nearly tripling by 1969. Much of this in-
creas~ cam from the rise in land values. Liabilities decreased between 
the year of purchase and 1962, but increased from 1962 to 1969. Net worth 
doubled from the year of purchase to 1962, and then doubled again from 
1962 to 1969. The ratio of net worth to total assets increased from .44 
in the year of purchase to .72 in 1962 and .74 in 1969 . The lack of great 
change in this ratio between 1962 and 1969 does not by itself signify a 
lack of financial improvement. The significance of land value appreciation 
suggests that in 1962 terms, the ratio may have declined by 1969. If this 
is so, it implies that either farmers found it more desirable to use debt 
financing or that the farmer's financial situation deteriorated. The ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities increased between the year of pur-
chase and 1962 indicating an improvement of the farmers' liquidity position. 
The increase of the ratio of fixed assets to fixed liabilities from the 
year of purchase to 1962 indicates that the difference between the value 
of these assets and the liabilities secured by them increased. The excess 
of current assets over current liabilities which is called working capital 
also increased from the start of the contract until 1962. The change in 
net worth from the start of the contract until 1962 was 140 percent. If 
the change in net worth is adjusted for land value appreciation and the 
gain realized by buyers who bought the land for less than its market value 
from a relative, the change is only 14.9 percent. 
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Table 11-4. Average financial progress of 1956 land contract sample 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Net Worth 
Working Capital 
Net Worth Divided by Total Assets 
Current Assets Divided by Current 
Liabilities 
Fixed Assets Divided by Fixed 
Liabilities 
Change in Net Worth, Year of 
Purchase to 1962 
Change in Adjusted New Worth, 
Year of Purchase to 1962d 
a (34, pp . 34, 36 , 44, 45 , 4 7) . 
Year Farm 
Purchaseda 
$49,440 
$27,660 
$21,780 
$ 6,382 
.44 
3.11 
1.63 
$73,002 
$20,605 
$52 ,39 7 
$10,766 
. 72 
3.34 
3.60 
1.40 
.15 
$145,449 
$ 36 ,892 
$108,555 
N.A.c 
. 74 
N .A.c 
N.A.c 
ho. Panagides, Economi cs Dept., Iowa State University. Unpublished 
data, 1969. 
cNo t available. 
dAdjusted by de flating 1962 value of land and buildings and deducting 
gain that arose through lower purchase price due to buyer and seller being 
related. 
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This information indicates that, on the average, this group of 
contract buyers were fairly successful. Much of their financial progress 
was due to the increased value of their land. The data does show an 
improvement in the current ratio and an increase in adjusted net worth 
from the time of purchase until 1962. These two changes were not in-
fluenced by land value appreciation . 
The 1956 sample was also asked to assess their contract terms, as 
well as whether the contract affected the availability of credit to t hem 
and whether they used off-farm employment income in t heir business. 
These results are shown in Table II-5 and show that most of those in-
terviewed were content with their contract terms and desired no changes 
in them. Only 5 percent had credit problems they attributed to the con-
tract and 11 percent used off-farm income in their business. Unfortu-
nately, these responses represent the experience of 102 contract buyers 
who were still on the farm in 1969 that they had purchased in the early 
1950's . The 52 buyers who were not interviewed would probably answer 
these questions with a greater percentage of affirmative answers. 
The Future for Land Contracts 
The trends discussed earlier in this chapter raise questions 
concerning the future use of land contracts as a method of financing 
farm land purchases for low-equity farmers. The situation facing con-
tract buyers today is quite different than that facing the contract 
buyer in the 1950's or 1960's. While the use of land contracts may 
areas of the state it would be much l arger. 
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Table II-5. Assess~nt of contract terms by 1956 land contract samplea 
Question 
Would you have pref erred the size of the payments 
to increase over the term of the contract ? 
Would you have preferred to have no payments on 
the principal for the first two or three 
years after you bought the farm? 
If you could rewrite your contract would you 
change the size of down payment? 
If you could rewrite your contract would you 
change the amount of the annual payment? 
Did you limit your operating capital by making 
too large a down payment? 
Have you ever felt handicapped in obtaining 
credit, or in financing machinery by 
chattel mortgage, because you bought 
your farm under contract? 
Did you work off the farm in order to ob tain 
operating capital or contract payments ? 
Percent 
Yes 
6 
17 
9 
13 
12 
5 
11 
Percent 
No 
94 
83 
91 
87 
88 
95 
89 
asource: D. Panagides, Economic Dept., Iowa State Univeristy. 
Unpublished data, 1969. 
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continued, it may be limited to established farm firms that are 
expanding. The average contract buyer in the 1956 sample paid $5,861 
down (9, p. 23). If he bought the same farm in 1974 with the same per-
centage down, the down payment would be approximately $31,000. In many 
areas of the state it would be much larger. 
Increased land prices not only increase the size of the down payment 
at a given percentage, but they also increase the amount to be amortized. 
The Murray studies have found that the high commodity prices of 1972 and 
1973 have been capitalized into farm land values. Farmers who buy their 
first land on contract typically depend on the land to provide suffi-
cient net income to meet most of the annual payment. If commodity prices 
were to return to a level that is closer to their historical trend, the 
low equity farmer would be hardpressed to generate the income needed 
for the annual payment. 
Increased farm size in terms of land and capital also has an impact 
on today's low-equity contract buyer. First, he must control more land 
than his counterpart in the 1950's did. If he does not, he may under-
utilize his own labor and have problems generating enough income. The 
need for a larger farm implies that he must either have a secure source 
of land he can rent or he must buy a larger farm. Renting requires 
less capital investment, but more insecurity of tenure. Buying requires 
a larger down payment and larger fixed annual obligations. 
Larger farm size in terms of capital implies that the buyer must be 
able to control the nonland resources necessary to combine with the land 
and his own labor and management in the production process. Control of 
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nonland resources requires that the farmer either own them himself, be 
able to borrow the money needed to buy them, or be able to hire or rent 
their services . Nonland assets depreciate and lose liquidity in terms 
of sale value after being placed in use by a farm firm . Because of this, 
the people or institutions advancing credit require collarteral and re-
payment capacity before they make loans for such assets. Larger down 
payments on the land contract divert more of the buyer's liquid capital 
f rom use in buying nonland assets. Since the land contrac t does not 
initially generate additional collateral in most cases, this implies 
that the farmer will have less collateral than he would have otherwise. 
The higher annual contract payments ~ill also reduce repayment capacity. 
The farmer's ability to control nonland resources is being constrained 
under these circumstances, while his need to control such assets is 
increasing. 
Related to the need for control of more nonland resources is the 
shift to capital -using, labor saving technologies. This sh ift increases 
the need to control nonlabor resources if the farmer's own labor is to 
be efficiently used. The use of less of the farm operator's labor and 
of more resources which must be bought also may add to the financial 
risk he faces since in many cases he finances the acquisition of non-
labor resources with credit. 
Increasing farm costs also affect the future for contract buyers. 
If they continue to increase, net income will fall unless prices received 
increase or resource productivity increases. Commodity prices of 1972 
and 1973 which are above the historic trend may not stay at this level 
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in the future. Increasing productivity usually requires the adoption of 
capital-using technologies which may be unavailable to the low-equity 
contract buyer who has used most of the credit and repayment capacity 
available to his firm. In a cost-price squeeze_ such as occurred in the 
1960 ' s, the low-equity contract buyer would be at a disadvantage due to 
the high level of fixed financial obligations on his firm. 
Throughout the preceding discussion, it has been implicitly assumed 
that contract terms were not changed. In another section the implica-
tions of changing contract provisions were examined. Within the restric-
tions imposed by the seller, the buyer may be able to improve his flexi-
bility and chance of success by any number of contract provisions. In 
addition to the three provisions discussed earlier, balloon payments, 
payments tied to price or yield levels, variable interest rates, pay-
men t in connnodities, provision for transfer to mortgage at a future date, 
extended period of grace, and others could be varied to suit his finan-
cial position. These possibilities may be expecially available for 
intra-family transfers by contract. Contracts that met the needs of 
buyers in the past may not necessarily do so for buyers at the present. 
Adherence to traditional contract terms may benefit neither the seller 
nor the buyer. On the other hand, changes in contract terms will have 
multiple implications for the buyer and his business. 
The amount of resources controlled by the buyer when he enters into 
the contract will also have a great effect on whether or not he succeeds. 
The greater his initial equity, all other things equal, the greater will 
be his chance of success. 
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Delimitation of the Problem 
The problem is whether or not the use of land contracts in Iowa can 
continue to successfully finance the acquisition of farm land by low-
equity farmers in the future. Society sanctions the use of the land 
contract in order to balance the rights of the buyer and seller. For-
feiture of land contracts is not considered t o be beneficial to society. 
This is partially evidenced by the fact that the courts have in several 
cases gone out of their way to uphold the idea that " .•• equity abhors 
a forfeiture (25, p. 48). The forfeiture of a contract usually involves 
a loss by the buyer, but if land prices were to ever decrease, it could 
c reate a monetary loss for the seller also. The failure of a firm in-
volves wasted resources when the sales value of the assets is less than 
their combined value as a firm. The success or failure of low-equity 
contract buyers would also affect the future structure of agriculture in 
Iowa . 
To work with this issue, it is necessary to focus the attention of 
this study on a smaller set of issues at a lower level for purposes of 
analysis. While the prior discussion has dealt with Iowa agriculture as 
if it were the same throughout the state and among farms, a meaningful 
analysis requires attention to the diversity of Iowa agriculture. This 
study will proveed to focus on one farm in a particular Iowa county. 
The options f or a low-equity farmer would be large in terms of how many 
acres he bought initially and how he organized his business. This study 
will constrain these options by considering only one farm size and a 
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limited set of farm enterprises. It will also abstract from the many 
potential combinations of economic conditions and the random elements 
associated with these conditions. This study will also focus on the 
first five years of the farm business after the contract is entered into. 
The large set of contract terms that cculd be studied will also be 
limited. The term and plan of amortization, as well as the proportion 
of the purchase price paid down will be varied in several combinations 
of terms . 
By restricting the scope of this study, a meaningul analysis is 
permitted with the resources available. The objectives outlined in 
Chapter I can be pursued, and the hypotheses posed below can be tested. 
Hypotheses to be Tested 
The purpose of the subsequent analysis is to provide insight into 
the following hypotheses. 
1. What will be the ability of land contract buyers to generate 
sufficient income to fulfill the terms of the contract, meet 
personal income needs, and pay other financial obligations 
with: 
a) farm product prices realized in 1973? or 
b) farm product prices based on an extrapolation of the 
previous years? 
2. What is the critical beginning equity level in order to generate 
sufficient income to meet the buyer's annual needs and 
obligations? 
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3. How sensitive is the buyer's business to stress such a crop 
yield reduction or drastic price reduction in a given year? 
4, For the same and different levels of beginning equity , what 
will be the e f fec t on perf ormance of t he contrac t tenns and 
growth of net worth when the follOW'ing are varied: 
a ) size of down payment ? or 
b) amortization plan? or 
c) length of amortization? 
By testing these hypotheses , success and failure element s in land con-
tract use will be discovered. Once this is done , suggestions can be 
made for improvements in land contracts by emphasis on success elements 
and elimination of failure elements. 
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CHAPTER III. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter will develop the method of analysis by which land 
contract use by an individual farmer will be examined . The analysis 
consists of four general steps. First, a model of the farm business 
is constructed that embodies the crucial relationships involved in a 
firm's production of output and its financing of the resources used in 
production of the output. Next the model is used to predict the out-
come in future periods given an initial set of resources, a set of pro-
duction alternatives, future financial obligations, and a set of future 
prices. The data obtained can then be used to tell how successful the 
firm was in fulfilling its financial obligations under a particular set 
of circumstances. Finally, the outcomes generated by varying the ini-
tial circumstances can be compared to ascertain why one set of circum-
stances produced a different outcome than another, and which set of 
control variables gives the best outcome in a given set of environmental 
conditions. 
Factors Involved in Specifying a Model for a 
Low-Equity Farm Firm 
The impact of a land contract on a farm business will vary according 
to the relation of the contract to the business. If land bought on con-
tract is being added to an established business that already controls 
or owns a substantial amount of assets and is capable of generating 
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large amounts of savings, the impact on the overall business and the 
decisions involved in it may be minimal. On the other hand, a low-
equity buyer who owns no other land and is attempting to gain control of 
land via the land contract may find that his options and decisions are 
largely dictated by the land contract. It is to this latter case that 
the development of this model is directed. 
Figure III-1 shows some of the interrelationships between the land 
contract and other decisions involved in the farm business. The first 
impact is that the land contract depletes the buyer's cash reserve when 
the down payment is made. The residual is available for investment in 
nonland assets or for meeting various business expenses. Some of this 
must also be set aside for consumption by the buyer. The buyer's 
available cash can be supplemented by the use of credit . Especially in 
the case of intermediate term borrowing, the level of residual cash, the 
legal nature of the land contract, and the fixed obligations imposed by 
the contract on the cash flows of future years will greatly affect the 
potential lenders' decisions. If the lender requires the buyer to have 
a fixed percentage equity in an asset in order to obtain credit for the 
remainder of its value, the amount of residual cash will fix the amount 
of intermediate term credit available. The legal nature of the land 
contract may make lenders extremely wary of advancing credit for con-
structing buildings or other improvements that become par t of the real 
estate. The collateral value of the building is reduced since the 
borrower does not have a security interest in the land on which the 
Land 
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Figure III-1. Effect of a land contract on a farm business. 
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building i s constructed. The lender would require a second mortgage on 
the building secured by an assignment of the contract. The assignment 
allows the lender to take over the contract in case the buyer defaults, 
but the lender must fulfill the defaulted provisions and in some cases 
pay the outstanding balance of the contract prior to the end of the 
thirty day period of gra ce . This arrangement may have serious disad-
vantages to many lenders and thus affect their lending pol icies to con-
tra ct buyers. Finally, the contract imposes a claim on future cash flows 
of the firm and thus affects its capacity to meet additional claims im-
posed by intermediate term borrowing . Lenders' concern with the ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities and cash flow budgets is an 
i ndication of their reaction t o this problem. This problem is especially 
important when the repayment pe r iod fo r the intermedia te term asset is 
less t han the time needed for it to generate sufficient cash flows to 
pay back for i tself . 
The combination of investments will influence the production 
decisions made by the buyer . The annual fixed obligations imposed by the 
contract, by inter mediate-term borrowing, and by other fixed expenses as 
well as for consumption need; will require the production process to gen-
erate suffic ient net revenues . Fixed expenses will be increased by in-
vestments made in productive assets. Income t ax liability will be 
g reatly affected by the land contract, by other borrow ing, by investment 
i n productive assets, and by the net income generated by production ac-
tivities. The interest on both the contract and on the borrowing reduces 
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taxable income. The fixed expenses incurred by productive assets owned 
by the firm are also deductible. In addition, depreciation on these 
assets also reduces taxable income over the life of the assets. Certain 
of these assets also create an investment tax credit when they are bought 
which can be used to reduce the actual tax liability. The net income 
generated by the production activities determines whether an income t ax 
liability will be c r eated and what its magnitude will be. 
Once the income tax liability has been satisfied, the requirements 
for consumption and the contract payment must be met. If the contract 
payment is not met, the contract would be forfeited and the buyer would 
no longer have an interest in the land. After meeting these two require-
ments, any cash remaining would be available for allocation in the fol-
lowing year. Obligations incurred by intermediate term borrowing in the 
previous year would carry over into future years . The services of pro-
ductive assets that were bought in a previous year would also be avail-
able for future use depending on the length of its productive life. In-
puts such as corn and gilts might also be carried forward for use in the 
next year's production. 
The model to be developed will embody these important relationships. 
It will also represent the alternatives and restrictions faced by the 
firm in its particular setting. 
Type of Analytical Model 
A number of studies have analyzed the production and financial 
aspects of farm firms in a multi-period context by using the dynamic 
42 
linear prograauning technique (20). The appeal of this type of approach 
is that some measure of the farmer's goals is maximized subject to a set 
of constraints. Discounted net income, terminal net worth, and discount-
ed consumption have been used as maximization criterion. Typically, the 
cons traints limit resource use to that amount which is owned or acquired 
by the firm in each of the periods. They also limit resource acquisition 
to that which the firm can internally finance plus that which the firm 
can internally finance plus that which the firm can externally finance . 
External financing is also restrained by the amount of credit which the 
firm would be able to obtain based on its financial structure and the 
behavior of lenders. The restraint set also requires the payment of 
various financial obligations such as fixed costs, debt repayment, income 
taxes, and consumption. Act ivities can be specified for production, bor-
rowing, resource acquisiton, investment, and satisfaction of financial 
obligations. The different periods are tied together in several ways. 
The c riterion function may be affected by activities in each year as 
with discounted net income and discounted consumption, or in only the 
f inal period as with terminal net worth which is a function of the ac-
tivities in the earlier periods. Outputs from one year can be trans-
ferred to the next year for use as inputs . Retained earnings can be re-
invested i n the firm in subsequent periods. Assets with useful lives 
longer than one period are available for use in the future. Debts incur-
red in one pe riod produce liabilities which must be repaid in future 
periods. 
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The flexibility of this type of model, as well as the fact that it 
optimizes along lines suggested by economic theory gives it strong appeal 
for use in analyzing the problem at hand. Once a basic model is con-
structed, certain elements within it can be changed to obtain different 
solutions . These changes will allow comparisons of different sets of 
contract terms, different beginning equ ities , and different commodity 
price levels . 
The major drawback of this type of approach is that it is difficult 
to incorporate the problems of risk and uncertainty, which are major in-
fluences on the behavior of farmers. Certain models have been developed 
wh ich deal with t hese problems (20). The model to be developed here 
will also abstract from these elements . Prices and yields will be known 
with certainty within the model. Analysis of the model output can, how-
ever, give some indications as to the sensitivi ty of the firm to income 
fluctuations. 
Variables in the Analysis 
Prices 
Two sets of commodity prices will be used in the analysis. These 
are shown in Table III-1. The first set of prices is the actual set of 
prices received f or f arm commodities in Iowa in 1973. The second set 
of prices, which is much lower, is based on a trend projection of past 
prices. The first set has already been partially capitalized into land 
44 
Table III-1. Commodity prices used in model 
Commodity Unit Set 1 
a Set 2 b 
Corn bushel $ 2.30 $ 1.58 
Soybeans bushel $ 5.50 $ 4.17 
Hogs cwt. $38.60 $28.41 
a 
(46' pp. 12, 18, 34). 
b (52). 
prices . The second set, which is used by a governmental agency for 
planning purposes, is what future prices will be if they conform to the 
time trend. It can be hypothesized that in some cases land contract 
buyers would be successful with the first set of prices, but not with 
the second set. 
The prices of nonfarm produced inputs are held constant at the 1973 
level. Their behavior in the past has been more consistent than that of 
commodity prices. Since 1964 they have risen in every year, and prior 
to that their trend was upward (46, p. 9). The model does abstract from 
this upward trend, but the effect of this trend will be looked at in 
another way as explained later in this chapter. 
Contract terms 
Three contract terms will be varied in the analysis. These are 
down payment, amortization plan, and length of amortization. Table III-2 
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shows the twelve different sets of contract terms tha t will be analyzed . 
By varying the contract terms, this study can compare the effect of 
changing one of these terms and holding the others constant on the prog-
ress of the firm. 
Table III-2. Contracts to be analyzed 
Contract 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Down 
Payment 
(percent) 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
Amor tizat ion 
Plan 
Springfield 
Standard 
a Increasing 
Springfield · 
Standard 
Increasing 
Springfield 
Standard 
Inc reasing 
Springfield 
Standard 
Increasing 
Length of 
Amortization 
(years) 
14 
14 
14 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
25 
25 
25 
aPrincipal payments increase by 40 percent of the first year's 
payment in each year. For example, to amortize $1,000 fo r five year s , 
principal payments are: Year 1-$111, Year 2- $155, Year 3-$199 , Year 
4 - $244, and Year 5-$288 . 
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Initial capital 
The third variable is initial capital available for use in the first 
year for uses other than the contract down payment. As previously men-
tioned, the level of this var iable will be crucial to the s uccess of the 
firm . By varying its level with a given set of contract terms and out-
put prices, the crucial level below which the fi rm cannot be successful 
can be ascer tained . In addition, the improvement in the fi rm's finan-
cial pos ition can be de termined for each additional amount of capital. 
Changing this variable can be done by setting t he initial level, 
and having the computer reduce it by $10,000 after each solution. When 
the model is no longer feasible, no more solutions will be computed. 
The last solution will be at the c ritical beginning equity level. This 
will be so because any further reduction in the beginning equity level 
of the fi rm would violate one of the financial obligation restraints 
making a solution impossible. 
Statistics Used for Analyzing Data 
Once solutions are generated by applying the model , five statistics 
can be computed for use i n comparing the different so lutions . These are 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, the ratio of debt 
to equity , the coverage ratio, t he rate of return on equity, and the 
rate of grow t h for net worth. 
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities, t he current 
ratio, gives a measure of the current liquidity of the firm. Current 
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assets include cash and assets that will become cash through the normal 
oper ation of the firm during the business year. Current liabilities are 
those which must be paid during the course of the year such as notes, 
accounts, taxes, and the annual contract payment. If this ratio is 
gr ea ter than one , t hen the firm has liquidity. The greater it is, the 
gr eater is the liquidity of the firm. Movement away from one would be 
an indicator of financial progress. The closer the ratio is to one, the 
greater would be the risk exposure of the firm due to income fluctuation. 
The ratio of debt to equity gives an indication of the long run 
liquidity of the firm. This ratio was approximately .23 for United 
States agriculture in 1973 (45, p. 77). For low-equity land contract 
buyers it will be much higher initially. Declines in this ratio repre-
sent an improvemen t of the financial situation of the business, especial-
ly declines from high levels to more moderate levels. 
A coverage ratio indicates the relation between the fixed financial 
obligations of a firm and its ability to service them from the income 
it generates in a year. The following cash-flow coverage ratio will be 
used: 
CF 
I + FC + P + M::: + T 
whe r e: 
CF annual net cash flows after variable costs 
I • annual interest payments for land contract and intermediate 
term borrowing 
FC = fixed costs on assets 
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P principal repayment for land contract and intermediate term 
borrowing 
MC = minimum consumption 
T income tax liability 
The higher this ratio is, the greater is the ability of the firm to ser-
vice its fixed obligations out of its net cash flows. An increase of 
this rat io over time would be indicative of financial progress. 
A ra te of return on equi ty can also be computed. This is: 
CF - (D + I + "MC) 
NW 
where : 
CF = annual net cash flows after va r iable costs 
D annual depreciation 
I annual i nterest payments for land contract and intermediate 
te rm borrowing 
MC = minimum consumption 
NW = net worth 
This rate of return can be meaningfully compared only when some alternative 
rate of return that the firm might earn is specified . In this case, the 
ra te of r eturn will be compared only to the rate of return obtained under 
different s ets of conditions . 
A g rowth rate for net worth can also be computed with the output 
generated by t he solution of the model. This statistic is computed as 
follows : 
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where: 
G = rate of growth 
NWt-l = net worth in the previous year 
NW = net worth in the present year 
t 
A positive change in net worth indicates that the firm has increased the 
amount of assets it controls or has decreased its debt which would lower 
financial leverage. The firm would have to pay proportionately smaller 
fixed charges in the future. If the rate of return on assets remains 
the same, the firm will have higher future earnings. Positive changes 
arise from decreasing liabilities or increasing the amount of assets 
controlled faster than liabilities increase. Rapid changes can be con-
sidered a sign of financial progress for the low-equity contract buyer, 
while smaller growth rates would be indicative of less financial 
progress. 
These five statistics will provide the basis for a comparative 
analysis of different sets of variables. In addition, the first three 
will provide an indication of the firm's ability to withstand income 
fluctuation under different conditions. Changes in each of the first 
five years after buying on contract will also be observed by using these 
statistics. For a given beginning net worth and commodity price set, 
the various contracts can be compared. For a given contract and com-
modity price set, the effect of increasing the buyer's beginning equity 
can be specified. Finally, for a given contract and beginning equity, 
the impact of higher commodity prices can be obtained. 
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CHAPTER IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYTICAL MODEL 
An Overview of the Model 
The model to be used will incorporate the issues discussed at the 
beginning of the previous chapter and the setting described later in 
this chapter into a dynamic linear programming model. The criterion 
function maximizes discounted net income for the length of the model. 
Activities are included for production, investment, obtaining inputs, 
short and intermediate term borrowing, transferring cash within the 
model, and paying fixed expenses and obligations. Restraints which 
specify the amount of certain resources available, impose restrictions 
on the level of certain activities, and require the payment of certain 
expenses and income taxes are also included. 
The model includes the first five years of operation after 
possession of the land is obtained. These would be the crucial years 
for the firm with respect to organizing its production to provide 
enough income to meet fixed expenses and obligations. In addition, the 
firm might be able to expand the options available to it if the first 
five years were successful. The activities and restraints are broken 
I 
down into five groups, each of which represents one year. The year is 
defined as lasting from December 1 to November 30. 
The years are linked together in several ways. In the criterion 
func tion, the income and expenses are discounted by a factor of 1.07 
in Year 2, (1.07 )
2 
in Year 3, and so on. The output of corn in one 
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year can be transferred to the next year for feeding hogs. Investment 
in machinery and livestock facilities in a given year provides capacity 
as well as fixed cost obligations in future years. Cash income not used 
for paying fixed obligations can be allocated among the various activi-
ties in the following year. Investment tax credits can also be trans-
ferred into future years until exhausted by income tax liabilities. 
Intermediate term borrowing creates financial obligations in subsequent 
years. 
The Setting of the Firm 
Although a statistical survey could have been used to obtain data, 
it was decided that this was too expensive in terms of the resources 
available to this study. Instead, a farm firm was synthesized along 
the physical and the institutional lines of the North Central region of 
Iowa. Since in certain instances parameters had to be obtained for a 
particular county, Boone County was used as the location of the synthe-
sized farm. This is true of the average land contract terms found in 
Contract 1 in the previous chapter. However, the synthesized farm firm 
could have been located in other counties of the North Central region 
since their physical and institutional parameters would be very similar 
to those found in Boone County. 
The typical soil in the area in which the synthesized farm is 
located is the Nicollet -Webster soil, and the crop activities in this 
model reflect this in their yields and their fertilizer requirements. 
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Most of the cropland in this area is used for growing corn and soybeans. 
The average farm size in 1973 for Boone County was 251 acres (15, p. l). 
The 1970 Iowa Farm Census found that 67 percent of the farms in this 
county raised livestock. Grain fed cattle were marketed by 34 percent 
of all farms , and 33 percent of all farms were farrowing sows (14, pp. 
7-10). Other livestock enterprises existed on a much smaller percentage 
of the farms. 
Reynolds' 1962 study of land contracts found that the average size 
of the farms bought on contract was somewhat smaller than the average 
fo r all farms (34, pp. 7, 10). Low-equity buyers can initially gain 
control of a farm via the contract and then expand later. The size of 
the farm to be considered in this study is 229 acres, of which 189 acres 
can be used for row crops, 22 acres can be used for pasture, and 18 
acres is used for the farmstead, roads, or wasteland. This size and 
breakdown is the same as for the average of the 0 to 239 acre group in 
Boone County that are summarized by the Iowa Farm Business Records. 
The pasture can be used for certain beef and hog technologies. Beef 
activities will not be included in the model due to the greater price 
uncertainty and capital requirements associated with them. Therefore, 
the pasture will be used for hog activities to be included in the model. 
The farm is assumed to be bought on contract with possession taken 
by the buyer at the beginning of the first year in the model. All land 
contracts entered into between October 23, 1973, and October 24, 1974, 
were examined at the Boone County courthouse. Sixteen contracts were 
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found whose average terms were used in this study. The average price 
paid per acre was $839, which would give a purchase price of $192,130 
for a farm the size of the one being considered in this study. The 
average interest rate was slightly over seven percent. Seven percent 
inter est on the unpaid balance will be used in this study for the con-
tract interest rates. Other contract terms' averages were 19.7 percent 
down payment, 14 years amortization, and Springfield Plan of amortization 
fo r all but one contract. These average terms are reflected in Contract 
1 in Table III-2. 
The farm is assumed to have a residence, a shelter for farm 
machinery, grain storage, and a building capable of farrowing eleven 
litters of pigs twice a year. 
The hypothetical land contract buyer has agricultural experience 
in the area, but has not farmed on his own previously. Such experience 
might have been as a hired worker or in a family farm arrangement. His 
management ability is -average and his crop and livestock yields are the 
recent historical average for the area. His beginning equity position 
is low. 
Activities 
The activities that are included in this model, the unit in which 
they are defined, and the years in which they appear are summarized in 
Table IV-1. 
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Table IV-1. Activities included in model 
Activity Unit Years 
Corn 1 - Use Equipment 1 1 acre all 
Corn 2 - Use Equipment 2 1 acre all 
Corn 3 - Use Equipment 3 1 acre all 
Com-Corn-Soybean Rotation 
(CCS-1) Use Equipment 1 3 acres all 
CCS-2 Use Equipment 2 3 acres all 
CCS-3 Use Equipment 3 3 acres all 
Hog 1 Sow + 2 
litters all 
Hog 2 Sow + 2 
litters 2,3,4,5 
Hog 3 Sow + 1 
litter all 
Hog 4 30 pigs all 
Buy Equipment 1 1 tmit all 
Buy Equipment 2 1 unit all 
Buy Equipment 3 1 unit all 
Swine Expansion 1 . 1 SOW 2,3,4,5 
Swine Expansion 2 10 pigs all 
Swine Expansion 3 1 S OW + 1 
litter all 
Selling corn 1 bushel 1,2,3,4 
Rent machinery 189 acres all 
Rent machinery 1 acre all 
Table IV-1. Continued. 
Activity 
Rent land 
Buy gilts 
Buy corn 
Hire labor in Period 2 
Hire labor in Period 4 
Short term credit 
Intermediate term credit 
Pay fixed cos ts 
Pay income taxes 
Pay consumption and principal 
Transfer cash to operating capital 
Transfer cash to investment capital 
Pay marginal consumption 
Transfer cash to savings account 
Transfer cash into tax payment row 
Transfer tax credit 
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Unit 
1 acre 
1 gilt 
1 bushel 
1 hour 
1 hour 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
1 dollar 
Years 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
all 
1,2,3,4 
all 
all 
1,2,3,4 
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Production activities 
Three activities in each year allow the firm to grow corn. Each 
is defined as a one acre unit. The difference between the three arises 
from the type of equipment used. Corn l uses a relatively labor in-
tensive machinery unit. Corn 3 uses a relatively labor extensive unit, 
and Corn 2 is intermediate between the other two. Yields are 108 bush-
els per acre in each year for all three activities. Variable costs are 
the same with the exception of machinery repair costs which increase as 
labor intensity decreases. Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the vari-
able costs for each of these activities. Labor requirements are shown 
in Table A- 2. 
A corn- corn- soybean rotation is specified in three more activities. 
The unit cons ists of two acres of corn and one acre of soybeans with 
corn yields at 108 bushels per acre and the soybean yield at 36 bushels 
pe r acre . Each activity uses a different system of equipment and thus 
repair costs and labor requirements vary in the same manner as the corn 
activities, a s shown in Tables A-1 and A-2. The machinery requirement 
for these activities is slightly less than that for the corn activities. 
Four hog-raising activities are specified in each year. The first 
two a r e the same except for the farrowing months. The unit is a sow 
and two litters farrowed and finished . Hog Activity 1 has the first 
lit ter farrowed in December and the second in June . Hog Activity 2 
s pecifies March and September as the farrowing months . It uses less 
labor than the first activity as shown in Table A-2 . Both activities 
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produce the same amount of pork and incur the same variable costs. Table 
A-3 shows the variable costs. Each activity utilizes one gilt which is 
sold after the second farrowing and retains one gilt from the first lit-
ter for use in the next year. Both activities require a central far-
rowing facility. Since the existing facility is only capable of two far-
rowings a year, the second activity becomes available for selection only 
after the first year because the business can then invest in central far-
rowing facilities which can be used for both activities. After weaning 
the pigs are finished in portable units on pasture. Both ac tivities 
require 202 bushels of corn. 
The third hog activity consists of a sow farrowing in June in a 
portable pasture facility. The gilt is sold after weaning the litter, 
and one is retained for use in the following year. Tables A-2 and A-3 
show respectively the labor requirement and the variable costs for this 
activity. Portable facilities used for farrowing in this activity are 
also used for finishing the pigs. The corn requirement is 102 bushels. 
The last hog activity is growing feeder pigs . Ten pigs are bought 
in each of the months of December, April, and August, and sold in March, 
July, and November. The same type of pasture equipment that is used 
for finishing pigs in the first two activities is used here. Labor 
requirements and variable costs are given in Tables A-2 and A-3. This 
activity uses 321 bushels of corn. 
58 
Investment activities 
The first set of investment activities is available in each year 
and allows the firm to invest in crop equipment. Equipment 1 is the 
least expensive, gives the lowest capacity, and uses the most labor per 
acre of use. Equipment 3 is the most expensive, gives the largest 
capacity, and uses the least labor, wrrile Equipment 2 is intermediate 
in all three aspects. Capacity is measured in terms of how many acres 
the equipment could be used on in the most restrictive month, taking 
into account the days suitable for fieldwork, a six day work week, and 
potential use of twelve hours per day on days suitable for fieldwork. 
The calculation for a given month is: 
No . of 6-day Avg. days suitable 
work weeks x for fieldwork = Capacity 
Machine hours per acre 
November was the most restricting month for all three systems. The 
capacities for growing corn of the three equipment systems are 378 
acres, 452 acres, and 770 acres respectively for Systems 1, 2 and 3 . 
The capacities are slightly larger for the corn-corn-soybean rotation. 
Table A-4 contains the information pertaining to these activities. 
The model also provides t hree activities for augmenting hog 
facilities. Two of these activities buy pasture equipment in any of 
the five years and the other allows the firm to purchase central far-
rowing facilities starting in Year 2. These types of facilities con-
form to what buyers and their non-land lenders would prefer to invest 
in. The portable pasture facilities are not attached to the land and 
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thus could be easily removed in case of contract forfeiture. They also 
have a relatively short payback period and require less capital. The 
central farrowing facilities does not have these advantages, but after 
the first year is allowable. If the first year was successful, the con-
fidence of the buyer and potential lenders would make this a reasonable 
investment. Other types of permanent hog facilities such as confine-
ment finishing buildings are not considered i n the first five years. 
Swine Expansion 1 buys central farrowing facilities in one sow 
units. While such a unit could be used for six farrowings a year by a 
superior manager, the assumption of average management ability is re-
flected in the model by limiting its use to four times a year. Its 
cost is $720 per unit with fixed costs of $41 per year and an expected 
life of twenty years. 
Swine Expansion 2 buys portable pasture finishing equipment that 
can be used for finishing pigs after weaning or for finishing feeder 
pigs. A unit of investment creates a capacity of ten pigs at once and 
can be used for two groups of weaned pigs in a year or three groups of 
feeder pigs as defined in Hog Activity 4. This equipment costs $69 , 
incurs annual fixed costs for repairs, insurance, and property taxes of 
$3.92, and has a life of five years. 
Swine Expansion 3 buys portable pasture facilities that can be 
used for farrowing and finishing pigs. It is used for Hog Activity 3, 
and is used only once a year. Its life is ten years, the investment 
cost is $274, and the annua l fixed costs are $15 .61. The swine expan-
sion activities are sununarized in Table A-5. 
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Selling activities 
Soybean and hog outputs are sold directly through the production 
activities. Hog Activities 1, 2, and 3 transfer one gilt ahead to the 
nex t year . Corn may be transferred forward for use in t he next year or 
s old in the current year. An activity is available in the first four 
yea r s to sell one bushel units of corn. This activity is not ava ilable 
in the final year when the corn is sold directly through the production 
activities. 
Input acquisition activities 
This group of activities can be split into two b road groups. One 
group acquires physica l inputs such as corn , gilts , land, machinery 
services , and labor while the other group secures cr edit . 
As mentioned earlier, machinery may be rented in any year by the 
use of two activities . The cost is $23 per acre fo r the machinery se r-
vices which are equivalent to those of Equipment 2 . The farmer supplies 
the fuel and labor. Actual costs for these activities are adjusted 
s ince the c rop raising activities include machinery repair costs . The 
f irst activity hires sufficient capacity for 189 acres which ca n be used 
to satisfy the constraint requiring purchase of Equipment l in each 
year. The second activity can lease additional machine r y capac i ty in 
units of one acre. 
Land may be rented in one acre units on a cash ren t basis . The 
cost per acre is $60 which is paid in two equal payments prior to plant-
ing the c rop and after its harvest . 
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Gilts may be bought for use in the hog activities in any of the 
five years. They must be paid for when bought. Another activity allows 
corn to be bought in one bushel units in any of the year s. This activi-
ty should be significant only in the first year when no inventory of 
corn exists for feeding hogs. If this activity is used in later years 
it may indicate cash flow problems to the extent that corn is sold to 
meet fixed obligations at the beginning of the year and the inventory 
must be replenished for feeding hogs. The cost of a bushel of corn is 
fifteen cents greater than what the farm receives in order to reflect 
transportation and transactions costs. 
Labor may be hired for the spring and fall fieldwork periods. This 
labor is hired on a part time basis and is assumed to be for operating 
field machinery. It can be hired at $2.10 an hour, but it is limited 
to not more than 250 hours in each period. 
Obtaining parameters for lending activities proved to be difficult. 
The local PCA indicated that it would make credit available to this type 
of farmer based on their past experience with the individual or his 
family and on what the repayment capacity of the business was projected 
to be. Repayment would be very flexible . No repayment schedule would 
be set up, but rather repayment would be made as the business had the 
cash available to do so. While the PCA is allowed to make loans for a 
maximum of seven years, it will refinance unpaid loans at that time. 
This agency also indicated that it had no specific equity requirement 
for assets such as machinery and buildings. 
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A corranercial bank in the area indicated that it would lend to a 
low-equity contract buyer provided that the business had sufficient re-
payment capacity. The bank required repayment in four years and a 
twenty-five percent equity in these assets. Interest rates for this 
type of loan would be nine percent. The bank would also extend short 
term c redi t for expenses associated with growing crops and livestock . 
This type of credit would have to be repaid within a year, would have 
no equity requirement, and would have an annual interest cost of eight 
and one half percent. This bank' s terms are used in the two borrowing 
activities in this model . These credit terms are probably more re-
strictive than those of the PCA. 
The fi rst borrowing activity obtains short term funds which are 
assumed to be borrowed for eight months at a cost of $ .056 per dollar 
borrowed. Longer term funds can be borrowed for a te rm of four years 
with four equal annual principal payments at an interest cost of nine 
percent on the unpaid balance. For each dollar borrowed in this activi-
ty, the model requires a $.33 transfer of the firm's own cash into the 
investable funds row. Although other collateral could be used in a 
rea l world situation, it is not used in this model. The equity in the 
l and contract is usually a poor source of collateral. Collateral from 
investment in farrowing facilities for other investments would be of 
doubtful value to lenders because of the legal nature of the land con-
tract as was previously discussed. The other assets depreciate more 
rapidly and thus would be losing collateral value over time. Again, 
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this forarulation may tend to restrict the amount of credit available to 
the firm. Principal rep yment is assured for the first activity by in-
cluding the obligation in the following year's cash availability row. 
The obligation for the second activity is included in the consumption 
and principal repayment rows of subsequent years. The interest charge 
for short term funds is deducted from the cash availability row of the 
next year and is deducted from the current y~ar's taxable income. The 
interest charge for intermediate term funds is included in the fixed 
costs rows of subsequent years which are deducted from taxable income 
for the year in which they are paid. 
Activities for paying expenses and obligations 
Three activities fall into t his class in each year. The first pays 
fixed costs associated with various assets. This consists of real estate 
and personal property taxes, insurance premiums , repair and maintenance 
costs, and the interest on the contract and on intermediate term bor-
rowing. The initial level for this activity is $3,498 plus the contract 
interest. Intermediate term borrowing and investment activities add to 
this liability. The various costs are summarized in Table A-6 and the 
annual interest obligation on the different land contracts is shown in 
Table A-13. Payment of these expenses is required by an equality 
restraint. Payment is deducted from the cash available at the start of 
the current year. Taxable income is reduced by an amount equal to this 
payment. There is no contract interest payment in the first year of 
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this activity since the contract would not have been in force for the 
prior year. 
The second of these activities pays income taxes. This payment 
includes Federal and Iowa income taxes as well as the self -employment tax. 
The combined tax rate will be varied according t o the level of minimum 
consumption and contract principal repayment specified. This will be 
done by calculating the minimum amount of after-tax income the firm would 
need to pay the owner ' s minimum consumption and the contract principal 
payment in each year. Once this is done the proper tax rate can be 
selected for each year for each contract. The combined tax rates are 
shown in Table A-11 . The income tax rates used with each land contract 
in each year are shown in Table A-12. Taxable income consists of gross 
income minus expenses of production, depreciation allowances, fixed costs, 
and interest paid on debt. The tax liability can be paid from investment 
tax credits generated by investnent in machinery or from net income gen-
erated by the year ' s activities. 
The third activity requires payment of the buyer's consumption, half 
the previous year's rent, and principal repayment. These payments are 
deducted from the cash available to the firm at the beginning of the year. 
The down payment for the land contract is included in this activity in the 
first year and the amortization of the principal begins in the second 
year. This pay~nt is not deducted from taxable inco~. Information con-
cerning this activity is sunnnarized in Table A-7. 
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Transfer activities 
Five activities transfer cash within the model or investment tax 
credits to other years. Each of these activities is available in each 
year, with the exception of the tax credit transfer which does not appear 
in the final year. The first of these transfers units of one dollar from 
the cash row to the operating capital row of the same year. The second 
activity is similar, except that it transfers cash into a row for invest-
ment capital. The third activity is a savings account which saves one 
dollar from the cash available in the current year. The dollar plus a 
five percent interest dividend is transferred to the next year's cash row. 
Another activity transfers cash into a row where it can be used to pay 
income taxes. A final activity transfers investment tax credits not used 
in one year into a row where it can be used in paying the next year's 
taxes. 
Restraints 
There are four general groups o f restraints which restrict the 
activities in each year. The firs t group requires the use of resources 
to be less than or equal to some level of availability. The second group 
sets certain limits on resource acquisition and investment activities. 
Another group restricts the amount of cash available to the activities in 
a year. The final group of equality constraints requires payment of the 
firm's financial obligations. All restraints are summarized in Table IV-2. 
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Table IV-2. Restraints incorporated into model 
Initial 
Description Units Level Years Type a 
Cropland acres 189 all GE 
Equipment 1 acres 0 all GE 
Equipment 2 acres 0 all GE 
Equipment 3 acres 0 all GE 
Labor-Period 1 hours 730 all GE 
Labor- Period 2 hours 705 all GE 
Labor-Period 3 hours 635 all GE 
Labor-Period 4 hours 473 all GE 
Corn bushels 0 all GE 
Corn Transfer bushels 0 1-4 GE 
Winter/Sunnner Farrowing sow + 2 
litters ll all GE 
Spring/Fal l Farrowing sow + 2 
litters 0 2-5 GE 
Finishing Facilities pigs 0 all GE 
Pasture Farrow/Finish sow + 1 
litter 0 all GE 
Gilts gilts 0 all GE 
Labor Hiring-Period 2 hours 250 all GE 
Labor Hiring-Period 4 hours 250 all GE 
Equipment 1 Investment equipment 1 all E 
a GE Greater than or equal to. 
E Eq ual to. 
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Table IV-2. Continued. 
Initial 
Description Units Level Years Type a 
Cash dollars varies 1-6 GE 
Operating Capital dollars 0 all GE 
Investment Capital dollars 0 all GE 
Income Tax Payments Row dollars 0 all GE 
Taxable Income dollars 0 all E 
Fixed Expenses dollars 3498 1-6 E 
Consumption and Principal Repayment dollars 5014 1-6 E 
Marginal Consumption Accounting Row dollars 0 1-4 E 
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Resource and input restraints 
The first of these restraints restricts the acres of cropland used 
in each year to less than or equal to 189 acres. This can be augmented 
in any year by renting land which is added to the 189 acres . 
The next three restraints involve equipment capacity for each of the 
three equipment systems . The capacity will be the same in each of the 
years after an investment is made unless augmented by machinery rental. 
The year is divided into four periods of labor use. These four 
restraints limit the amount of labor used in each period to not more than 
what the farm operator can provide, but the availability in the spring 
and fall can be supplemented by labor hiring in these periods. The op-
erator 's labor availability is calculated on the basis of a six day work 
week with twenty-five hours a month deducted for overhead activities 
s uch as buying inputs, selling outputs, or doing the paperwork associated 
with the business . Information relating to this restraint is sutmnarized 
in Table A-14. 
Constrain ts also limit selling and feeding of corn. A row exists 
in each of the first four years in which corn that is produced is accumu-
lated . This corn may be sold or transferred to the next year . Another 
row exists in each year that accumulates corn that is transferred from 
the previous year or that is bought. This corn may be used for the hog 
activi ties. Corn must be bought in the first year if hogs are to be fed 
since there is no carryover of corn from the previous year. 
Four rows restrict the use of hog activities in each year . One, 
winter-summer farrowing, has an initial capacity of farrowing eleven sows 
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twice a year . The rest have no initial capacity. All four may be 
augmented by investment. Farrowing facilities can be bought after the 
first year while portable pasture farrow to finish and finishing facili-
ties can be bought in any year. Investment in any of these facilities 
adds capacity to the same row in each of the subsequent years. 
The availability of gilts is limited to the sum of those bought 
and those transferred from the previous year. There is no transfer into 
the first year so that gilts must be bought for use in that year. Every 
unit of the first three hog activities transfers a gilt forward for use in 
the following year. 
Restraints on labor hiring and machinery investment 
Two restraints in each year restrict the labor hiring activities to 
not more than 250 hours in each period. These restraints reflect the 
limited availability of part time labor within a given community . Another 
restraint requires the firm to invest in one unit of Equipment 1 or to 
hired machinery to operate 189 acres. Since the capacity of Equipment 1 
is a prerequisite for investment in Equipment 2, and the capacity of Equip-
ment 2 is a prerequisite for investment in Equppment 3, this constraint 
effectively limits owned Equipment 2 capacity to a maximum of 452 acres, 
owned Equipment 3 capacity to a maximum of 770 acres, and owned Equipment 
1 capacity to 378 acres . 
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Cash rows 
A row exists in each year which contains cash . In the first year 
this cash is given from outs ide the model, but in subsequent years the row 
is supplied with the gross income from the sale of crops and livestock in 
the previous year . Withdrawals are made from this row for payment of the 
current year 's consumption, fixed expenses, contract obligation, and 
principal and interest repayment for short and intermediate term borrowing. 
The previous year's income tax liability and half of the rent obligation 
are also deducted from this row. The remainder can be transferred into 
rows for investment or operating expenses, or can be allocated to a sav-
in gs account. 
Two rows exist for operating and investment capital. Variable costs 
for production activities, cost of gilts, and one half of land rent are 
withdrawn from the annual operating capital row. Investment capital is 
required for the purchase of machinery or hog facilities . Either row may 
be supplemented by borrowing or from the cash row. 
Investment tax credit from the purchase of machinery in any year is 
stored in another row. The purchase price of the machinery bought multi-
plied by seven percent gives the amount of tax credit . If the credit is 
not used up in the first year, it can be transferred into future years 
fo r use. Cash may also be transferred to this row in the case where there 
is not enough tax credit to satisfy the tax liability. 
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Financial ob ligation restraints 
Four equality restraints in each year require the payment of income 
taxes, minimum and marginal consumption, principal repayment on loans, 
interest on loans, and fixed costs of insurance, repairs, and property 
taxes. Minimum consumption and principal repayment on the contract are 
. 
fixed in the initial level for this constraint . The initial level is in-
creased by the use of intermediate term credit in the previous years and 
by land rented in the previous year. Taxable income is initially zero, 
but is increased by all activities that generate income. All expenses of 
production, fixed costs, and interest on debt are deducted from taxable 
income. Depreciation of machinery and hog facilities also reduces taxable 
income. For every dollar of taxable income in this row, the model requires 
payment of the tax liability in tax credits or cash. 
The restraint on fixed costs has an initial level of $3,498 plus 
contrac t interest, but this is increased by investments in machinery or 
buildings and by intermediate term borrowing. These costs include insur-
ance, property taxes, and repair costs for the buildings owned by the firm. 
The costs for fixed expenses, minimum consumption, and contract payments 
are sunnnarized in Tables A-6, A-7, and A-13. 
A final equality constraint collects net income above variable costs 
for all activities in the year. From this is deducted fixed costs and mini-
mum consumption for the following year, as well as the current income tax 
liability. For every dollar remaining, the following period's consumption 
is increased by $.175. This coefficient's derivation is explained in 
Table A-7. 
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Objective Function 
The net contribution or reduction of net income by each activity is 
entered in the objective function. These values are shown in Table IV-3. 
The entries are discounted by seven percent according to the year in which 
they occur. A low-equity land contract buyer could be expected to dis-
count income fairly heavily for two reasons. First, the risk of losing 
the land due to forfeiture of the land contract would tend to place a low-
er value on future returns. The importance of this factor would depend 
on what the buyer thought the probability of forfeiting the land contract 
was and the buyer's level of risk aversity. Second , the marginal rate of 
return on equity would be relatively high for a low-equity farmer which 
would mean that present income would have a high value over future income. 
The discount rate used here is somewhat higher than that used in another 
farm firm growth model of fo ur years ago (22, p. 95). Increasing the 
rate above seven percent would have meant that the value for selling corn 
in one year was greater than the absolute value for buying corn in the 
following year . Under such circumstances the model would sell all of its 
corn production and buy all the corn it needed in the following year which 
would be unrealistic. The fixed financial obligations in the constraint 
s et of this model will reduce the range over which the objective function 
can influence the firm ' s activities, especially in solutions at or close 
to the critical equity level. 
Annual fixed costs incurred by assets that the model invests in are 
discounted back t o the year in which the investment is made and entered 
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Table IV-3 . Objective function values 
Value Corn 1 Corn 2 Corn 3 ccs 1 
(Trend Prices) 
Year 1 
Real $-43.18 $-44. 90 $-48.87 $ 39.69 
Discounted -43.18 -44.90 -48.87 39.69 
Year 2 
Real -43.18 -44.90 -48.87 39.69 
Discounted -40.35 -41.96 -45.67 37.09 
Year 3 
Real -43.18 -44.90 -48. 87 39.69 
Discounted -37. 71 -39 .21 -42.68 34.66 
Year 4 
Real -43.18 -44.90 -48.87 39.69 
Discounted -35.24 -36.65 -39. 89 32 .39 
Year 5 
Real 127.46 125.74 121. 77 380.97 
Discounted 97 .23 95.92 92.89 290.64 
(1973 Prices) 
Year 1 
Real -43.18 -44.90 -48.87 87 .57 
Discounted -43.18 -44.90 - 48.87 87 .57 
Year 2 
Real -43. 18 -44.90 -48.87 87 .57 
Discounted -40.35 -41. 96 - 45.67 81.84 
Year 3 
Real -43 .18 -44.90 -48.87 87 .57 
Discounted -37 . 71 -39 .21 -42.68 76.48 
Year 4 
Real -43.18 -44.90 -48.87 87 .57 
Discounted -35.24 -36 .65 . -39. 89 71.48 
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Table IV-3. Continued. 
Value Corn 1 Corn 2 Corn 3 ccs 1 
Year 5 
Real $205.22 $203.50 $199.53 $584.37 
Discounted 156.56 155.24 152.22 445. 81 
Value ccs 2 ccs 3 Hog 1 Hog 2 
(Trend Prices) 
Year l 
Real $ 34.60 $ 22.52 $ 62 7. 25 
Discounted 34.60 22.52 62 7. 25 
Year 2 
Real 34 .60 22 . 52 62 7 . 25 $ 62 7. 25 
Discounted 32. 33 21.04 584.21 584 . 21 
Year 3 
Real 34.60 22 .52 62 7 . 25 627.25 
Discounted 30 . 22 19.-6 550 .22 550 . 22 
Year 4 
Real 34.60 22 . 52 62 7. 25 62 7 .25 
Discounted 28 . 24 18 . 38 514.14 514 .14 
Year 5 
Real 375 . 88 363.80 689. 75 689.75 
Discounted 286. 75 277.54 530 .58 530.58 
(1973 Prices) 
Year 1 
Real 82 . 48 70.40 970.41 
Discounted 82.48 70.40 970.41 
Year 2 
Real 82 .48 70.40 970 . 41 970 . 41 
Discounted 77 .08 65 . 79 906 . 93 906 . 93 
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Table IV-3. Continued. 
Value ccs 2 ccs 3 Hog 1 Hog 2 
Year 3 
Real $ 82.48 $ 70.40 $ 970.41 $ 970.41 
Discounted 72 .04 61.49 84 7 .55 84 7 .55 
Year 4 
Real 82. 48 70.40 970 .41 970 .41 
Discounted 67 .32 57.46 792.15 792.15 
Year 5 
Real 569.28 567.20 1055. 33 1055.33 
Discounted 441.92 432. 71 805 .11 805 .11 
Value Hog 3 Hog 4 Sell Corn Buy Corn 
(Trend Prices) 
Year 1 
Real $ 329 .53 $ 777 .00 $ 1.58 $ -1.73 
Discounted 329 .53 777 .oo 1.58 -1. 73 
Year 2 
Real 329.53 777.00 1.58 -1.73 
Discounted 307.97 726 .17 1.48 -1.61 
Year 3 
Real 329 .53 777 .00 1.58 -1. 73 
Discounted 289.06 681.58 1. 39 -1.52 
Year 4 
Real 329.53 777. 00 1.58 -1. 73 
Discounted 270 .11 636. 89 1.29 -1. 42 
Year 5 
Real 392.03 777 .oo -1. 73 
Discounted 301.56 597.69 -1.33 
(1973 Prices) 
Year 1 
Real 506.81 1180. 71 2 . 30 -2.55 
Discounted 506.81 1180 . 71 2 . 30 -2.55 
76 
Table IV- 3. Continued. 
Value Hog 3 Hog 4 Sell Corn Buy Corn 
Year 2 
Real $ 506.81 $1180. 71 $ 2. 30 $ -2.55 
Discounted 473 . 65 1103.47 2. 15 - 2.38 
Year 3 
Real 506.81 1180. 71 2.30 - 2.55 
Discounted 442.65 1031.25 2.01 -2 .23 
Year 4 
Real 506.81 1180. 71 2 .30 -2.55 
Discounted 413. 71 963.81 1. 87 - 2 . 08 
Year 5 
Real 591. 73 1180. 71 - 2 .55 
Discounted 451.43 900.76 -1.94 
Value Buy Equip- Buy Equip- Buy Equip- Rent 
ment 1 ment 2 ment 3 Land 
(Trend Prices) 
Year 1 
Real $-60.00 
Discounted $22 ,872 $ 8,505 $30,023 - 60.00 
Year 2 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 28,100 8,837 33,243 -56.08 
Year 3 
Treal -60.00 
Discounted 32,986 9,237 36,162 -52.63 
Year 4 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 37 ,555 9,609 38,899 -49.18 
Year 5 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 41. 823 9,958 41,438 -46.16 
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Table IV-3. Continued. 
Value Buy Equip- Buy Equip- Buy Equip- Rent 
ment 1 ment 2 ment 3 Land 
(19 73 Prices) 
Year 1 
Real $-60 . 00 
Dis counted $30,058 $11,263 $39 '398 -60.00 
Year 2 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 36,014 11, 752 42.981 -56.08 
Year 3 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 41,581 12,209 46 '329 -52.63 
Year 4 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 46,784 12,636 49,458 -49.18 
Year 5 
Real -60.00 
Discounted 51,646 13,035 52,383 -46.16 
Value Swine Ex- Swine Ex- Swine Ex- Buy 
pansion 1 pansion 2 pansion 3 Gilts 
(Trend Prices) 
Year 1 
Real $-62.50 
Discounted $ -17.19 $ 19.83 -62.50 
Year 2 
Real -62.50 
Discounted $ 810.73 3.27 49.79 -58.41 
Year 3 
Real -62.50 
Discounted 880.90 22.38 77. 78 -54. 82 
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Table IV-3. Continued. 
Value Swine Ex- Swine Ex- Swine Ex- Buy 
pansion 1 pansion 2 pansion 3 Gilts 
Year 4 
Real $-62.50 
Discounted $ 946.49 $ 40.24 $ 103.94 -51.23 
Year 5 
Real -62.50 
Discounted 1,007.77 56 .92 128 . 39 -48.08 
(1973 Prices) 
Year 1 
Real -85.00 
Discolll1ted -17.19 36.97 -85.00 
Year 2 
Real -85.00 
Discounted 1,122 .00 6.20 69. 72 -79.44 
Year 3 
Real -85 .00 
Discounted 1,203.00 28 .09 100.32 -74.24 
Year 4 
Real -85 .00 
Discounted 1,278.00 48.62 128. 92 -69.39 
Year 5 
Real -85.00 
Discolll1 ted 1,348.00 67 . 63 155.66 -64. 85 
Value Hire Labor Hire Labor Short Term Inter. 
Period 2 Period 4 Credit Term Credit 
Year 1 
Real $ -2.10 $ -2.10 $ - . 056 
Discounted -2 . 10 -2.10 -.056 $ -.196 
Year 2 
Real -2 .10 -2.10 -.056 
Discounted -1.96 -1.96 -.052 -.183 
Table IV-3. Continued. 
Value 
Year 3 
Real 
Diecol.mted 
Year 4 
Real 
Discounted 
Year 5 
Real 
Discounted 
Year 1 
Real 
Dis col.ID ted 
Year 2 
Real 
Discounted 
Year 3 
Real 
Discounted 
Year 4 
Real 
Discounted 
Year 5 
Real 
Discol.mted 
Hired Labor 
Period 2 
$ -2.10 
-1.84 
-2.10 
-1. 72 
-2.10 
-1.61 
Savings 
Account 
$.05 
.05 
.05 
.047 
.05 
.044 
.05 
.041 
.05 
.038 
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Hire Labor 
Period 4 
$ -2.10 
-1.84 
-2.10 
-1. 72 
-2.10 
-1.61 
Rent Machinery 
for 189 acres 
$-2 79 7. 
-2 79 7. 
-2 797. 
-2614. 
-2 79 7. 
-2443. 
-2797. 
-2283. 
-2 79 7. 
-2133. 
Short Term Inter . 
Credit Term Credit 
$ -.056 $ 
-.049 -. 337 
-.056 
-.045 -.482 
-.056 
-.042 -.617 
Rent Machinery 
for 1 acre 
$-14. 80 
-14.80 
-14 .80 
-13 .83 
-14.80 
-12.92 
-14.80 
-12.08 
-14.80 
-11.29 
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in the objective function. Productive assets other than land which have 
lives greater than five years must also be compensated for in the objective 
function. Otherwise the investment would not be as profitable as it 
normally would be. In order to compensate for these assets, the cash in-
f l ows attrib utab le to the asset after the fifth year are discounted and 
entered in t he objective function in the year in which the investment is 
made . Although future use and income from them are unknown, I assume that 
dep r eciation is paid back in equal payments over the life of the asset with 
no sal vage value . In addition, a rate of return on the cost of the invest-
ment is received in each year. Tables A-8-A-10 show the derivation of 
estimates for these values. Intermediate term borrowing activities that 
star t after the secon d year are also compensated for in the objective func-
tion . The unp aid portion after the sixth year is discounted and included 
in t he objective function in the year in which the credit is obtained . 
Two sets of values are shown in Table IV-3. The two sets reflect the 
two different sets of farm prices to be used in the model Activities which 
do not involve farm prices have the same objective function values 
under either price set ass umption . These activities which do not change 
are labor hiring, short and intermediate term credit, the savings account, 
ren ting machinery , and renting land. 
Artificial and Disposal Activities 
This model will require an artificial activity for each restraint that 
is specified as an equality. Such activities provide a basis for the 
comp utat ion of a solution and disappear early in the computation process 
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because a -M, a value of large magnitude, is entered in the obj ective 
func t ion for them. 
Disposal activities are required for all of the greater than or equal 
to r estraints specified in the model. These activities have no objective 
func t ion value, positive or negative. They allow for underutilization of 
resources . 
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CHAPTER V. ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE 
REPRESENTATIVE FA.RM FIRM 
The organization of the firm's production activities varies with the 
different solutions to the model obtained with the trend price level, 
especially as the beginning equity level is varied . A general pattern 
of organization emerges when the various solutions are compared. To 
facilitate the discussion, the contracts and the beginning equity levels 
are listed and named in Table V-1 . The contract terms were summarized 
in Table III-2 . 
Between 220 and 384 acres of crops are grown in each of the solutions 
to the model. Corn-Com-Soybean rotations are used in all the solutions . 
Less than ten acres of continuous corn are grown in one year in several 
solutions. Labor during the harvest season is a limiting resource, and 
since the rotation uses less labor during that period, it is a more 
profitable activity . The acreage of crops grown generally declines as 
the beginning equity declines with a given set of contract terms. This 
is because the higher beginning equity allows the firm to invest in Equip-
ment 3 which requires less labor to operate, and thus allows the firm to 
grow more crops. This pattern does not hold true for most of the cases 
that occur at the critical beginning equity level because in these cases 
few or no hog facili t ies can be acquired in the first years. This allows 
labor to be used for growing crops with leased machinery until the firm 
can finance the acquisition of hog facilities. The amount of crops grown 
in each solution is sumnarized in Table V-2 . 
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Table V-1. Cases to be discussed 
Case Contract 
1 1 
2 1 
3 2 
4 2 
5 2 
6 3 
7 3 
8 3 
9 4 
10 4 
11 4 
12 5 
13 5 
14 5 
15 6 
16 6 
17 6 
18 7 
19 7 
20 7 
21 8 
* Critical level of beginning equity. 
Beginning Equity 
$90,000 
$87,110* 
$90,000 
$70,000 
$61,970* 
$90,000 
$70,000 
$47,158* 
$80,000 
$70,000 
$66,448* 
$80,000 
$70,000 
$48,178* 
$80 ,000 
$70,000 
$46,938* 
$80,000 
$70,000 
$63,888* 
$60,000 
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Table V-1. Continued. 
Case Contract Beginning Equity 
22 8 $50,000 
23 8 $41.086* 
24 9 $60,000 
25 9 $50 ,000 
26 9 $37,332* 
27 10 $70,000 
28 10 $60,000 
29 10 $54,369* 
30 11 $60,000 
31 11 $50,000 
32 11 $37 , 724* 
33** 1 $60,000 
34** 1 $50,000 
35** 1 $46,938* 
36** 7 $50,000 
37** 7 $40,000 
38** 7 $37 ,332* 
**1973 price level used in these solutions. 
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Table V-2 . Acres of crops grown 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 379 379 382 384 304 
2 298 298 298 298 293 
3 258 270 276 . 270 300 
4 263 263 263 263 260 
5 282 282 280 282 26 7 
6 251 263 250 263 300 
7 247 258 250 262 300 
8 353 353 218 220 243 
9 290 290 290 290 300 
10 314 314 314 314 274 
11 323 323 290 323 277 
12 251 263 263 263 300 
13 24 8 259 259 263 300 
14 232 232 221 225 262 
15 253 303 304 304 301 
16 249 270 270 304 301 
17 378 220 220 220 260 
18 331 331 316 316 301 
19 323 323 323 308 297 
20 298 298 298 298 259 
21 247 259 259 263 301 
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Table V-2. Continued . 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
22 233 240 240 240 270 
23 221 221 221 221 262 
24 248 263 263 263 301 
25 234 245 245 245 301 
26 378 263 220 220 262 
27 263 263 263 263 301 
28 287 287 287 287 281 
29 300 300 300 300 272 
30 243 258 258 263 301 
31 234 245 245 245 301 
32 333 333 221 221 262 
JJ 413 304 304 304 301 
34 378 2 76 304 304 301 
JS 378 259 304 304 301 
36 413 304 304 304 301 
37 376 289 304 304 301 
38 378 261 304 304 301 
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Except for Cases 17 and 26, 22 litters of pigs were grown in the 
first year of all cases. Both of these cases had such a low beginning 
equity that finishing facilities could not be acquired as needed by the 
hog activities. In the second year, these two cases acquired the required 
finishing facilities to utilize the farrowing facilities that were on the 
farm. Starting in the second year, the model allowed investment in ad-
ditional farrowing facilities, and all cases used this activity. The 
higher the beginning e quity was over the critical level, the earlier was 
the investment in fa rrowing facilities . Most of the solutions for which 
the beginning equity level was critical were unable to invest in these 
facilities until the fifth year. The maximum amount of litters farrowed 
was approximately 160, with most solutions achieving this level. Both 
spring-fall and winter-summer farrowing activities were used, but in the 
final year the spring-fall activity, which uses less labor, was used more 
for reasons that will be discussed later. The amount of litters farrowed 
in each year of each solution is shown in Table V-3. 
Feeder pigs were grown in the first year of each solution, except 
for Cases 17 and 26, which as previously noted, did not have sufficient 
beginning equity to invest in hog finishing facilities. These two ~ases 
were able to obtain finishing facilities in the second year. The solutions 
at the critical beginning equity levels depended most heavily on the feeder 
pig activity throughout the five years, whereas the solutions with a higher 
ini t ial equity level either dropped or greatly reduced this activity once 
farrowing facilities were obtained. Since all cases were able to obtain 
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Table V-3. Litters of hogs farrowed 
Case Year 1 Yea! 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 22 22 72 72 151 
2 22 22 22 22 90 
3 22 154 154 154 160 
4 22 22 98 98 164 
5 22 22 35 35 155 
6 22 154 154 154 159 
7 22 154 154 154 160 
8 22 22 22 22 146 
9 22 22 12 7 127 159 
10 22 22 53 53 160 
11 22 22 34 34 156 
12 22 144 144 144 159 
13 22 144 144 144 159 
14 22 22 22 22 156 
15 22 150 150 150 159 
16 22 154 154 154 159 
17 0 22 22 22 160 
18 22 22 114 114 159 
19 22 22 22 22 159 
20 22 22 22 22 132 
21 22 154 154 154 159 
22 22 111 111 111 161 
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Table V-3 . Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 22 22 22 22 157 
24 22 154 154 154 159 
25 22 156 156 156 159 
26 0 22 22 22 156 
27 22 22 154 154 159 
28 22 22 61 61 160 
29 22 22 22 22 156 
30 22 154 154 154 159 
31 22 156 156 156 159 
32 22 22 22 22 156 
33 22 150 150 150 159 
34 22 150 150 150 159 
35 0 140 150 150 159 
36 22 150 150 150 159 
37 22 150 150 150 159 
38 0 150 150 150 159 
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farrowing facilities by the fifth year, this activity on l y appears in 
tha t year in Case 8 at a l ow level. This ac tivity has the advantage of 
a l ow investment requirement for facilities, but as the firm accumulates 
capital fo r investment, it moves away from this activity because it uses 
more labor and ope rating capital than do the farrowing activities. Table 
V-4 shows the level of this activity for each of the years in each of the 
solutions. 
Corn is bought and sold in each year of all the solutions . While 
buying corn is necessary in the first year because no inventory exists, it 
would not be necessary in later ye ars in a real situation because the firm 
produces enough corn . Corn produced by the firm and held in inventory for 
feeding in the following year could be used as collateral for a loan to 
be repaid when the livestock a re sold. The model does not allow this , 
and thus it sells enough corn in each year so that it can meet its finan-
cial r eq uirements and carries the rest over to the next year for the hog 
ac tivities . Corn is also sold to genera t e cash fo r investment purposes . 
The cases with the highe r initial equities build up inventories of corn 
much more rapidly than the cases that are closer to or at the critical 
i ni tia l equity level. This reduces the cos t of feeding hogs in these cases 
and reduces the amoun t of short term credit th at must be obtained. 
Land is rented i n each year of each case as demonstrated in Table V-5. 
This activity ranges from 195 acres to 31 acres. In most cases, the solu-
tions with beginning equities furthest from the critical level rent mor e 
land since they have more capital for investment in Eq uipment 3, the 
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Table V-4 . Feeder pigs fed 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 562 562 
2 627 627 627 62 7 
3 1,4 79 
4 1, 350 1,350 552 570 
5 1,176 1,176 1,030 1,030 
6 1,488 
7 1,494 5 43 
8 66 66 1,665 1,665 114 
9 1,094 1,094 18 
10 876 876 530 562 
11 798 798 660 678 
12 1,488 
13 1,493 s 5 
14 1,521 1,521 1,660 1 , 660 
15 1,444 
16 1,479 
17 1,666 1,666 1,666 
18 755 755 
19 906 906 906 1,094 
20 666 666 666 666 
21 1,493 5 5 
22 1,556 554 554 554 
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Table V-4 . Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Yea r 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 1 , 666 1,666 1,666 1,666 
24 1,488 
25 1,507 
26 1,150 1,666 1,666 
27 1,350 1, 350 
28 1,129 1,129 72 7 72 7 
29 1,007 1,007 1,007 1,007 
30 1,494 6 6 
31 1,507 
32 312 312 1,666 1,666 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
93 
Table V-5. Acres of land rented 
Case Year l Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
l 190 190 193 195 115 
2 111 111 111 111 106 
3 70 81 78 81 111 
4 74 74 74 74 71 
5 93 93 91 93 78 
6 63 74 61 74 111 
7 58 70 61 74 111 
8 164 164 29 31 54 
9 102 102 102 102 102 
10 125 125 125 125 85 
11 134 134 134 134 88 
12 62 74 74 74 111 
13 58 70 70 74 111 
14 43 43 32 36 73 
15 64 114 115 115 112 
16 60 82 82 115 112 
17 189 31 31 31 71 
18 142 142 12 7 127 112 
19 134 134 134 119 108 
20 109 109 109 109 109 
21 58 70 70 74 112 
22 44 52 52 52 81 
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Table V-5. Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 32 32 32 32 73 
24 59 74 74 74 112 
25 45 56 56 56 112 
26 189 74 32 32 73 
27 74 74 74 74 112 
28 98 98 98 98 91 
29 111 111 111 111 83 
30 54 69 69 74 112 
31 45 56 56 56 112 
32 144 144 31 31 73 
33 224 115 ll5 115 112 
34 189 87 115 ll5 112 
35 189 70 115 115 112 
36 224 115 115 115 112 
37 187 100 115 115 112 
38 189 73 115 115 ll2 
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labor-saving machinery. Exceptions to this pattern are the first four 
years of Cases 5, 11, and 29, the firs t two years of Cases 8 and 32, and 
the first year of Cases 17 and 26. Each of these cases is at a critical 
beginning equity level which prevents large investments in hog facilities. 
Because of this, these solutions rent large amounts of machinery services 
and lan d in order to grow crops in those years. The magnitude of the land 
renting activity in these soluttons suggests that there is additional un-
certainty for the firm in these cases. 
Macinery is rented in nearly all the solutions, but is most important 
to the cases which are at or near the critical beginning equity level. 
This also represents an additional source of uncertainty for the firm. 
Labor is hired in the two periods in which this is allowed, the spring 
planting season and the fall harvest season. In all solutions, labor is 
hired to the maximum level allowed by the constraint set in the fall har-
vest season. In several cases , no labor is hired in the spring, but in 
most cases this activity enters at a level greater than zero, but less 
than the 250 hour maximum specified in the constraint set . Allowing the 
firm to hire additional labor for the fall harvest season would have a 
beneficial impact on net income in all solutions. 
As would be expected, the greater the difference between the critical 
level of beginning equity and the actual level of beginning equity was, 
in general, the lower was the amount of short term credit obtained by the 
firm . The amount of short term credit also declined in amount in each 
case from the first to the fourth year. This occurs because of several 
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factors . First, most solutions to the model reduce the amount of feeder 
pigs with the passage of time. Since these require more operating capital 
than other activities, the reduction reduces the total amount of operating 
capital needed, and in turn, the amount of short term credit needed. 
Second, the fi rm is able to build up its operating capital with its sav-
ings. This is especially true as it builds up its holdings of corn over 
time which reduces the need for credit to buy corn. Finally, as the firm 
is better ab le to car ry its own corn over to the next year for feeding, 
the cost of corn fo r feeding becomes less, and the amount of credit needed 
declines. 
As Table V-6 shows, there are exceptions to the two relationships 
discussed in the previous paragraph. These show up in solutions that 
are a t the critical l evel of beginning equity . All years of Case 2 use 
less short term credit than in Case 1 which has a higher initial equity. 
This is because much less land is rented in Case 2 and because machinery 
is owned i n Case 2 , while some machinery capacity is leased in Case 1. 
The pattern is also reversed in the first two years of Case 8 because the 
low ini tial equity does not allow investment in many hog facilities. The 
amo\.IDt of litters farrowed and feeder pigs fed is low during these two 
years , reducing the amount of short term credit needed . This same pattern 
is repeated in the first two years of Cases 20 and 32 and in the first 
year of Cases 17 and 26. The significant amounts of short term credit 
used in all cases indi cate its importance t o the production organization of 
the firm . Although the use of short term credit does not appear in the 
statistics f rom the balance sheet that will be discussed later, its use 
does contribute t o the financia l risk faced by the firm. 
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Table V-6. Dollars of short term credit 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 43,566 42.531 40,681 38 '951 60,000 
2 40,156 39,469 38 ,285 35,983 39,825 
3 40,246 40,958 35,202 31,186 5 7 ,392 
4 52 '716 51,431 49,098 47,509 59,810 
5 58,829 57,565 52,945 51, 774 59,942 
6 36,447 47,198 28 ,589 23, 798 52,009 
7 54,291 4 8, 892 41,311 38,319 59,761 
8 32, 462 31,097 65, 729 64,108 60, 353 
9 39,912 38,659 37 ,254 34,634 60,608 
10 47,524 46,298 41, 728 40,103 61,123 
11 50,227 49 ,011 44,269 42,335 60,821 
12 46,447 41,419 31,870 19,640 55,493 
13 54,275 50,431 41,998 31,598 59,761 
14 66,425 65,061 62,218 55 '745 60,478 
15 43,735 43 ,486 30,562 22 ,823 5 7 ,931 
16 54,126 48 ,286 34 '722 30, 716 5 7 '926 
17 26 ,185 69 ,311 61,224 51,82 7 61,157 
18 28,898 2 7, 705 26, 718 20,570 59,462 
19 45,991 44,821 35,903 33,417 63,494 
20 42,212 41,282 39,807 35 ,4 76 50,921 
21 54,669 52,212 42,992 33,407 58 ,821 
22 60,915 59, 753 52 ,091 43,752 59,490 
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Table V-6. Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Yea r 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 69,816 68 ,451 62, 172 54 ,894 60,447 
24 54 ,512 48,291 35,595 24,578 5 7 ,807 
25 57,423 53,257 43,310 32 ,65 7 59,137 
26 26 ,185 5 7, 704 64,636 56,799 60,187 
27 43,019 41 , 795 39 ,042 32,984 58 ,533 
28 50 ,692 49, 434 42, 36 7 34 ,965 61,522 
29 54,978 53, 736 50,047 43 ,508 60 ,831 
30 52 , 155 48 ,436 37 ,143 25 , 300 5 7, 807 
31 5 7 ,423 55,155 45 ,974 35 , 4 70 59,247 
32 38 , 173 36,809 66,241 58 , 463 60 ,133 
33 29,491 61,983 37 ,125 16 , 431 71 ,154 
34 33 ,491 73,385 59 ,001 29,278 71,154 
35 26 ,185 70 ,065 68, 700 38 ,090 71 ,154 
36 29,885 58 , 510 30 ,071 9 ,359 71 ,154 
37 33,425 74 , 310 51,375 22, 881 71,154 
38 26,185 73,577 59,162 2 7 , 216 71,154 
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The greater the beginning equity with a given set of land contract 
terms, the greater was the amount of the intermediate term borrowing. 
This is shown in Table V-7. Only Case 16 does not conform to this pat-
tern. In that case, the beginning equity for Case 15 is large enough 
to furnish the funds needed for investment without as much credit as is 
used by Case 16 which has a lower initial equity. There are two reasons 
for the general relationship between intermediate term credit and initial 
equity level. First, this borrowing activity requires a twenty-five per-
cent equity in assets acquired on credit that must be met with cash at the 
time the credit is obtained. The higher initial equities can put more 
funds into meeting this requirement. Second, the cases with initial equi-
ties that are further away from the critical level can invest in more 
assets in the earlier years. This creates a greater repayment capacity 
for loans obtained in subsequent years. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the largest volume of loans is obtained in the later years in most 
cases. 
In all solutions, a certain amount of the owner's labor is not used. 
This occurs mainly in the winter months. As hog facilities are acquired, 
especially farrowing facilities, the amount of unused labor is reduced. 
This is true for the summer period as well, where smaller amounts of labor 
are not used. There are several years in several solutions in which small 
amounts of labor are not used in the spring also. The largest amounts of 
unused labor occur in cases that are at or near the critical beginning 
equity level for the particular contract. This can be seen in Table V-8. 
The greatest non-use of labor is in the first year of Cases 17 and 26, 
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Table V- 7. Dollars of intermediate term borrowing 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 6,768 15 ,494 
2 9,396 
3 15,959 77 ,544 
4 10 ,436 33 34,220 
5 1,744 23 20,813 
6 100,460 
7 17,905 64 1,518 55,576 
8 542 2. 76 7 16,898 
9 14,413 33 52 ,651 
10 4,158 55 33,646 
11 1,601 21 25,655 
12 17,905 88,793 
13 17,905 1,503 60,042 
14 3,059 240 1,812 30,708 
15 33,492 377 50. 76 7 
16 22 ,2 32 12,441 5 7, 993 
17 3,309 39 ,851 
18 12,879 63,756 
19 324 45,506 
20 15, 951 
21 17,905 1,503 52414 
22 12,052 37,416 
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Table V-7. Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 896 32,184 
24 19,432 73,082 
25 279 16,525 51,314 
26 2,417 892 29 J 376 
27 18,104 58 ,4 79 
28 5,412 41,216 
29 25 J 851 
30 19,355 1,847 73 ,072 
31 279 18,136 49,064 
32 967 2,341 28,798 
33 22,629 19,865 25, 982 
34 8,539 22,29 7 11 ,659 39,607 
35 18 J 716 23 J 779 46,077 
36 22,629 19 ,865 16,084 
37 7,432 28,696 6,366 30,366 
38 25,086 17,408 35,107 
Table V-8. Un used labor 
Year 1 Year 2 
Case Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 
1 382 13 196 382 13 196 359 
2 372 0 200 372 0 200 372 
3 106 0 30 44 0 0 44 
4 147 0 57 147 0 57 93 
5 200 0 89 200 0 89 194 
6 104 0 30 43 0 0 43 
7 103 0 30 42 0 0 30 
8 546 103 309 546 103 309 52 
9 225 0 104 225 0 104 148 
10 291 0 145 291 0 145 277 
11 315 0 160 315 0 160 310 
12 104 0 30 43 0 0 43 
13 103 0 30 42 0 0 42 
14 97 0 28 97 0 27 54 
15 119 0 39 53 0 0 53 
16 108 0 33 45 0 0 45 
17 664 150 377 52 0 0 52 
18 287 0 167 328 0 167 200 
19 280 0 136 128 0 136 280 
20 360 0 193 360 0 193 360 
21 103 0 30 42 0 0 42 
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Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Per. 2 Per . 3 Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 Pe r. 2 Per. 3 
6 186 359 5 185 59 0 0 
0 200 372 0 200 299 0 160 
0 0 44 0 '() 104 0 0 
0 30 87 0 24 96 0 0 
0 90 190 0 84 52 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 104 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 104 0 0 
0 3 52 0 0 40 0 0 
0 65 142 0 59 104 0 0 
0 142 267 0 132 84 0 0 
0 161 306 0 155 63 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 104 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 104 0 0 
0 0 53 0 0 59 0 0 
0 0 53 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 54 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 74 0 0 
0 93 200 0 93 99 0 0 
0 136 222 0 100 98 0 0 
0 193 360 0 193 131 0 57 
0 0 43 0 0 99 0 0 
Table V-8. Continued 
Year 1 Year 2 
Case Per. 1 Per . 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 
22 85 0 20 44 0 0 44 
23 52 0 0 52 0 0 52 
24 105 0 31 43 0 0 43 
25 101 0 31 39 0 0 39 
26 664 150 377 211 0 100 52 
27 148 0 57 148 0 57 44 
28 214 0 98 214 0 98 183 
29 252 0 121 252 0 121 252 
30 104 0 31 42 0 0 42 
31 101 0 31 39 0 0 39 
32 470 71 261 470 71 261 52 
33 558 91 308 52 0 0 52 
34 563 104 316 57 0 7 52 
35 664 150 377 101 0 38 52 
36 558 91 308 52 0 0 52 
37 564 105 317 55 0 4 52 
38 664 150 377 59 0 11 52 
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Year J Year 4 Year 5 
Per . 2 Per . 3 Per . 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 
0 0 44 0 0 91 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 58 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 39 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 53 0 0 
0 1 44 0 1 99 0 0 
0 81 183 0 81 94 0 0 
0 121 252 0 121 60 0 0 
0 0 43 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 39 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 51 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 . 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 
0 0 52 0 0 99 0 0 
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both of which have very low beginning equities and are at the critical 
level. Both cases are able to use more of the owner's labor in sub-
sequent years as the firm invests its savings from the initial year in 
hog facilities. 
Fractional units of crop machinery were specified in many cases. 
This was less apt to occur in those solutions which were at the critical 
beginning equity level because these cases relied more on leasing machinery 
than on buying it . Only in Case 2 was a complete unit of machinery bought 
in the initial year. This case was at the critical beginning equity level 
of the contract which imposed the greatest annual financial obligations 
on the finn . Several cases bought a complete unit of Equipment 3 by buy-
ing fractions of it in several years. The fact that labor restrictions 
precluded the complete use of the capacity provided by a complete unit of 
Eq uipment 3 influenced the investment pattern. Investment in farrowing 
facilities occurred at realistic levels. Although fractional units of it 
and the finishing f acilities were specified, the effect of adjusting the 
level of investment to an integer level would not greatly affect the cash 
flows in the model. 
The investment pattern of the final year of the model is distorted 
from what would occur in a real situation. The difficulty arises from the 
fact that the model specifies that assets such as machinery and hog facili-
ties earn a rate of return for the remainder of their lives which is entered 
into the objective function in discounted form. Current assets such as 
corn and cash that exist after the end of the fifth year do not have a rate 
of return entered in the objective function . Because of this, the model 
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reduces the amount o f current assets in the fifth year by converting 
them to hog facilities or machinery . In some cases, it accumulates mo re 
assets than it has labor t o efficiently utilize . It may use some far-
r owing facilities only twice a year rather than four times. In addition 
to liquidating its corn inventory, many solutions also obtain large 
amoun t s of credi t t o finance the assets . It should be noted that the 
model requires payment of income taxes for the fifth year, the obliga-
tions f or the land contract and for intermediate term borrowing that fall 
due at the beginning of the following year, the minimum consumption for 
the operator in the next year, and the fixed costs for the assets in the 
following year. This tendency t o convert current assets to longer term 
assets is much more pronounced as the beginning equity level is increased 
above the critical point. Those solutions obtained at the critical level 
barely s how this tenden cy since their borrowing ability is constrained . 
The ability of some cases to obtain and repay large loans by the time of 
the fifth year s uggests that at that time, other enterprises such as feed-
ing bee f or f inishing hogs i n confinement might become feasible for the 
fi rm to adopt. This increased repayment capacity might also be applied 
toward more rapid retirement of the land contract principal obligation if 
possible, or even towards obtaining additional land by land contract. 
I n general, the solutions of the model under the different sets of 
conditions imposed by the various land contracts showed that the firm 
would gr ow corn and soybeans on its own land as well as on land that is 
rented . In addition, it would grow feeder pigs and farrow twenty-two 
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litters of pigs Wltil it was able to invest in additional farrowing 
facilities. With the addition of new farrowing facilities, feeder pigs 
would no longer be grown. The solutions also show that the firm would 
utilize short term credit to meet most of its operating expenses. These 
general results show the necessity of non-equity resources to the land 
contract buyer if he is to be successful in meeting the annual obligations 
imposed by the land contract, truces, and his own consumption. The results 
also clearly demonstrate that to be successful in meeting the contract 
terms, the business must obtain income from sources other than the land 
that was bought. Of the eleven critical beginning equity levels, only two 
did not have hog activities in the first year. All cases rented land in 
all years . 
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CHAPTER VI. IMPACT OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF BEGINNING EQUITY 
This chapter discusses the impact of varying the level of beginning 
equity with a given set of contract terms for the cases that were solved 
with trend prices. In all but one of the various sets of contract terms, 
three diffe rent levels of beginning equity have been summarized with the 
s tatistics that were discussed in Chap ter III.l As with the production 
organization of the firm, a general pattern emerges, but exceptions will 
be noted and discussed. The combinations of contract terms were stated 
in Table III-2 and the combinations of contracts and initial equity levels 
were summarized i n Table V-1. 
As previously discussed, the current ratio gives an indication of the 
current liquidity of the firm. As might be expected, this ratio is higher 
with the higher beginning equities when a particular contract is imposed 
on the firm. With the initial equit i es that are at the crucial level, the 
ratio is close to one at the end of the fi rst year , but grows larger over 
time. In half of such cases, it declines in both Year 4 and Year 5, while 
in Case 11 it declines in the final year. These declines are caused by 
the trans format ion of current assets to intermediate term assets. In mak-
i ng this transformation, inventories of corn are depleted in Year 4 which 
causes a large income tax liability which also decreases the ratio. 
1For Contract 1 the maximum level for beginning equity level was set 
at $90,000. Only two solutions were obtained because the constr aint set 
al lowed reduction to $87,110. 
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In those cases not at the crucial level of beginning equity, no 
general pattern of change during the first four years emerges for the cur-
rent ratio. In some cases it drops after the first year due to large in-
vestments in farrowing facilities in the second year. Some of the cases 
with initial equities that are above the critical level also show an upward 
trend of this ratio in the first years. In all cases not at the critical 
equity level, only Case 1 does not have a pronounced drop in the current 
ratio in the final year. This is caused by the model's propensity to 
make large investments in the final year. Case 1 is not much greater in 
beginning equity than the critical level for the contract so that large 
investments in the final year are constrained. 
The significance of the current ratio is that it gives an indication 
of the firm ' s s usceptibility to income fluctuation arising from reduced 
yields or lower prices. The ratio shows that the cases which started at 
a higher initial equity would be better able to withstand such problems 
in a given year . This is especially true in the earlier years. For those 
cases at the critical level of beginning equity, the rise in this ratio 
over time indicates progress in the firm's ability to withstand problems 
caused by downward fluctuation of income. These ratios are listed in 
Table VI-1. 
The coverage ratio indicates the degree to which the income flows 
produced in the current year can pay the obligations due in the beginning 
of the next year. These ratios are shown in Table VI-2. When the ratio 
is less than one, it indicates that cash assets are being used to meet the 
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Table VI-1. Current ratios 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 1.50 1.60 1.53 1.65 1.83 
2 1.38 1.42 1.52 1.54 1. 73 
3 2.47 2.20 2.31 2 .50 1.38 
4 1.81 2.11 1.83 1.97 1.82 
5 1.41 1.66 1.63 1. 78 1. 82 
6 3 . 42 3.32 2.64 3.60 1.38 
7 2.37 2 .14 2.07 2 . 26 1.41 
8 1.48 1. 70 1.63 1. 72 1.80 
9 2 . 06 2 .40 2 .03 2.23 1.44 
10 1.58 1.86 1.80 2.02 1. 70 
11 1.40 1.65 1.67 2.05 1.83 
12 2 .68 2 .51 3.04 2.69 1.38 
13 2.25 2.11 2.57 2 . 30 1.47 
14 1.44 1.84 2.18 1.97 1.87 
15 4.59 2.65 2 .6 3 2.35 1.58 
16 2. 72 2 .56 2 . 74 2.16 1.48 
17 1.57 2.02 2.47 2 .16 1.72 
18 2 . 16 2.90 2.40 2.16 1.45 
19 1.68 2 . 27 2 . 40 2.01 1.57 
20 1. 39 1.54 1.67 1.69 1.89 
21 2.09 2.08 2.42 2.15 1.58 
22 1. 76 1.90 2.21 2.04 1. 70 
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Table VI- 1 . Continue d. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 1.43 1.86 2.18 1.99 1.83 
24 2.55 2.49 2.78 2 .35 1.45 
25 2 . 16 2.19 2.58 2.19 1.64 
26 1.50 1.84 2.14 1.97 1.86 
27 2 .17 2 . 82 2.26 2.18 1.52 
28 1.69 2.29 2.28 2.02 1.64 
29 1.41 1.65 1.93 1. 87 1.87 
30 2.40 2 . 40 2 .85 2.40 1.47 
31 2.01 2.02 2.42 2.21 1.69 
32 1.47 1. 83 2 . 17 1.92 1.97 
33 1. 74 2 . 06 2.40 2.30 1.87 
34 1.50 1. 76 2 . 28 2.08 1.58 
35 1.47 1. 70 2 .12 1.99 1.46 
36 1. 90 2.29 2.60 2.46 2 .14 
37 1.62 1. 95 2. 46 2.31 1. 76 
38 1.59 1.91 2.43 2.22 1.63 
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Table VI-2. Coverage ratios 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 1.03 1.01 1.09 1.07 1.09 
2 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.06 
3 1.10 1.13 1.14 1.11 .81 
4 1.03 1.02 1.15 1.08 .94 
5 1.03 1.00 1.18 1.09 1.04 
6 1.09 1.14 1.65 1.20 .80 
7 1.09 1.11 1.27 1.11 . 77 
8 1.04 1.02 1.15 1.06 1.01 
9 1.03 1.03 1.17 1.11 .80 
10 1.05 1.03 1.22 1.14 .96 
11 1.18 1.13 1.38 1.31 1.23 
12 1.08 1.11 .99 1.52 .79 
13 1.02 1.05 .94 1.41 .80 
14 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.43 1.05 
15 1.11 .91 1.13 1.55 .88 
16 1.10 . 97 1.16 1.55 .83 
17 1.05 1.04 1.00 1.56 . 74 
18 1.03 .74 1.07 1.41 .83 
19 1.02 . 72 1.00 1.53 .91 
20 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.22 1.10 
21 1.08 .99 1.00 1.50 .88 
22 1.07 .99 .99 1.44 .93 
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Table VI-2. Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 1.04 .98 1.00 1.45 1.04 
24 1.10 .99 1.09 1.61 .82 
25 1.09 1.03 1.00 1.54 .89 
26 1.03 1.07 1.00 1.41 1.05 
27 1.04 . 89 1.10 1.33 .85 
28 1.04 .80 1.04 1.49 .93 
29 1.04 1.02 1.00 1. 36 1.06 
30 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.64 .83 
31 1.09 1.02 1.00 1.54 .92 
32 1.04 1.08 1.00 1.43 1.10 
33 1.08 1.12 1.29 1.67 1.36 
34 1.23 1.21 1.04 1.66 1.19 
35 1.19 1. 33 1.00 1.60 1.11 
36 1.10 1.57 1.42 1. 76 1.51 
37 1. 31 1.18 1.18 1. 75 1.29 
38 1.27 1.30 1.09 1. 74 1.22 
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obligations. In certain cases, this occurs in Years 2 or 3, but this is 
because corn inventories are being built up in these years. This occurs 
in the second year of Cases 15, 16, 18, 19, 21 through 24, 27, and 28, 
and in the third year of Cases 12, 13 and 22 . The net result of this can 
be seen by referring to Table Vl-1 which shows that the current ratio 
either increased, or decreased due to large investments in those years. 
These ratios also drop below one in the final year for many of the cases. 
The cases which involve a critical beginning equity level have coverage 
ratios greater than one in the final year with the exception o f Case 17. 
Those cases with coverage ratios that drop below one in the final year 
use operating capital to meet the obligations at the beginning of the sixth 
year, while those which have coverage ratios above one generate sufficient 
net cash flows to meet the obligations. The reason for the ratio being 
below one is the model's propensity to convert current assets into inter-
mediate assets in the final year. 
The cases with critical beginning equities are less apt to have 
coverage ratios that are less than one in the first four years. Only in 
Case 23 does the ratio drop below one. This is because these cases have 
very little cash which is used as operating capital. Because of this, 
they must generate income to meet the obligations of the following year. 
In almost all of the cases with critical beginning equity levels, the 
coverage ratio is close to one in the first two or three years. Case 11 
does not conform to this pattern. Its coverage ratio is higher because 
it does not build up large inventories of corn. 
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No general pattern of coverage ratios emerges for the cases with 
non-critical beginning equity levels other than what has been discussed. 
Some of them have a much higher coverage ratio in Year 4 when the inven-
tories of corn are liquidated. The coverage ratios are high in years 
prior to when large investments are made. The important point that these 
ratios bring out is that the cases which are at the critical beginning 
equity level are much more dependent on their cash flows to meet financial 
obligations. In addition, the closeness of this ratio to one in many such 
cases indicates that a year of low income could create a situation in 
which the firm would be unable to pay its financial obligations . The 
combination of higher coverage ratios and higher current ratios that are 
generally found as beginning equity is increased suggest that these cases 
wo uld have a grea t er chance of success under conditions of income stress. 
The debt-equity ratios are shown in Table Vl-3. In all cases they 
decline during the first four years. In the cases at the critical begin-
ning equity level, the decline in the final year as well. Most of the 
other cases rise slightly in the final year. This ratio declines because 
of growth in net worth and/or declines in the amount of debt outstanding, 
both of which are indicative of financial progress by the firm. The high-
est beginning equity with a particular contract has the lowest debt-equity 
ratios in the first four years . The decline of this ratio caused by amor-
tizing the land contract principal implies progress towards complete own-
ership of the land. However, the decline in this ratio caused by increased 
equity or reduced debt for non-land assets means that the firm would have 
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Table VI-3. Debt/equity ratios 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 1.67 1.42 1.25 1.03 .87 
2 1. 74 1.49 1.26 1.08 .93 
3 1. 70 1.59 1. 31 1.08 1.38 
4 2 . 14 1. 81 1.65 1.37 1.36 
5 2.40 2 . 00 1. 74 1.47 1. 27 
6 1.64 1. 36 1.22 1.04 1.59 
7 2.11 1.96 1.66 1. 38 1.53 
8 3.20 2. 72 2 .39 2.03 1.83 
9 1. 89 1.60 1.49 1.23 1. 38 
10 2 . 12 1. 78 1.57 1.32 1.29 
11 2 . 23 1.87 1.61 1. 32 1.25 
12 1.85 1. 74 1.41 1.22 1.69 
13 2 . 11 1.97 1.59 1. 38 1.62 
14 3.15 2 . 59 2.14 1. 91 1. 76 
15 1. 83 1. 85 1.53 1. 34 1.46 
16 2.08 1.94 1.59 1.50 1.69 
17 3.26 2. 75 2.28 2.04 2.03 
18 2.00 1.65 1.49 1.28 1.57 
19 2 . 27 1.84 1.53 1.37 1.49 
20 2.49 2 .12 1.82 1.59 1.35 
21 2.63 2. 34 1. 86 1.61 1. 74 
22 3 . 18 2. 72 2 . 17 1. 87 1.82 
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Table VI-3. Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 3.83 3.09 2.53 2.24 2.02 
24 2 .56 2.30 1.85 1.63 1.99 
25 3. 13 2.64 2.10 1. 84 1.97 
26 4.36 3.61 3.00 2.65 2.27 
27 2.37 1.97 1.81 1.53 1.69 
28 2.75 2.22 1.89 1.67 1. 70 
29 3 . 03 2.54 2 .11 1. 84 1.65 
30 2.60 2.35 1.87 1.64 2.01 
31 3.15 2 .77 . 2.18 1. 87 1.95 
32 4.22 3 .52 2.95 2. 71 2.24 
33 2 . 09 1.46 .99 .83 .67 
34 2.37 1.69 1.16 . 84 .84 
35 2.46 1. 76 1. 30 .93 .95 
36 2 . 46 1.67 1.15 .90 .76 
37 2.90 2.01 1. 35 1.00 .94 
38 3.06 2.11 1.47 1.08 1.04 
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greater collateral value from these assets if it needed to obtain credit. 
The reduction in this r atio also decreases the amount of financial charges 
that must be paid from the income produced by the firm ' s assets. This 
reduces the risk of not being able to pay the financial charges due each 
year. 
The rate of return on equity fluctuates from year to year within the 
various cases because of the inven torying of corn in some years and the 
depletion of those inventories in other years. However, with all but one 
case , the rate of return increas es as the beginning equity level is de-
creased. Case 1 has a slightly higher initial equity position than does 
Case 2 and a higher rate of return in four ou t of the five years. The 
small difference in beginning equity allows a slightly mo r e efficient pro-
duction organization. The more general r es ult is what would be expected 
from economic theory . A firm is usually faced with a hierarchy of projects 
or enterprises in terms of their rate of ret urn. It allocates its 
resources first to the project with the highest marginal rate of return 
until its marginal rate of return is equal to the marginal rate of return 
for the next highest project . It then allocates resources to both of these 
projects until the marginal rate of return is equated to the third highest 
project's highest marginal rate of return. The process is continued until 
the capital budget is exhausted. As this process is continued and the 
capital budget is expanded, the average rate of return on equity declines. 
The statistics in Table VI-4 show that this occurs in the solutions of the 
model as the initial equity is increased with a given set of contract terms. 
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Table Vl-4 . Rates of return 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 15 .45 13.46 17.65 15.49 17 .03 
2 13.74 12.50 11.53 16. 39 14.51 
3 16 . 33 18.56 19 .85 15 .26 6.10 
4 19.88 14.31 24.31 18. 75 13.92 
5 21. 71 14.48 24.90 18.25 19.74 
6 10 . 58 7.86 34 .41 13.04 6.11 
7 14. 32 19 . 08 29.91 19.68 8.95 
8 23 . 37 16.18 27. 83 20.76 23 .59 
9 18 . 05 13.46 23.23 18.21 11. 77 
10 20.57 14.21 24.18 18 . 08 15 .09 
11 21. 86 13.86 25.03 18.56 18.13 
12 13 . 64 16.07 9.40 33.76 5. 71 
13 16 . 19 18.51 10. 86 35 .90 7.69 
14 25. 84 13.55 12 .16 37. 79 21.08 
15 9.94 3.61 16.79 38.41 7 .29 
16 11.07 6.96 17.38 42.65 6. 77 
17 18 .82 11.91 9.17 44.13 4. 72 
18 1 7 . 59 16. 74 34.40 8.28 
19 18. 72 9.81 39.09 13.76 
20 18 . 56 15.68 12.30 23.43 19 . 23 
21 20 .01 13.66 12.82 42.13 10.68 
22 25.27 14 . 98 14.20 41.93 15.95 
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Table VI-4 . Conti nued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
23 29.47 13 .40 12.92 42.91 22 .95 
24 15.63 13.01 18.64 49.86 16.19 
25 19. 37 15.62 12. 77 48.05 12.45 
26 23.12 18. 70 12 .12 44.38 25.87 
27 19 . 80 6 .14 21.10 32 .83 9.84 
28 21.96 1.4 7 15.09 41.55 15 .16 
29 23.59 16.32 12.76 33.32 22.28 
30 17 . 09 10.94 10 . 43 47.56 6.66 
31 22.84 16. 33 12. 93 46.14 12.99 
32 28.15 19. 82 12 .02 41.16 26 . 95 
33 49 . 23 38.05 39.63 57 .06 25.18 
34 77 . 46 53.73 26.10 62 . 18 26.60 
35 74.40 67. 70 24. 79 61.45 27 .44 
36 51.42 66.31 46. 77 61.00 27 .25 
37 94.57 51.07 35.16 67 .26 28 .13 
38 91 . 74 66.37 29 .2 7 70 .13 28.83 
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The average rate of return is also affected by the use of debt funds . 
A simple example will illustrate this. Project A requires $500 and yields 
a ten percent rate of return. Project B also requires $500, but only 
yields a five percent rate of return. These two projects are the only al-
ternatives for the use of equity funds. Funds may be borrowed at an inter-
est rate of four percent. Situation 1 has $1,000 of equity funds which it 
invests in both projects to yield an average rate of return on equity of 
7.5 percent . Situation 2 has $500 of equity funds and $500 of borrowed 
funds and invests in both projects also. The rate of return on equity in 
this situation is eleven percent. This effect is financial leverage and 
involves the use of debt funds as long as their use provides a return 
greater than their cost and as long as sources of debt are willing to pro-
vide the funds. The greater use of short term debt as the initial equity 
is reduced with a given contract resembles this effect and is partially 
responsible for the higher rates of return that are obtained as the begin-
ning equity level is decreased. 
With the exception of Cases l and 19, decreasing the initial equity 
level increased the annual and overall rate of growth of net worth as 
shown in Table VI-5. This is tied to the average rate of return. The 
lower equity levels had higher rates of return, and thus were able to gen-
erate more savings relative to the size of their net worth which resulted 
in more growth on a relative basis. Case l had a lower rate of return, 
and thus a lower growth rate than did Case 2. The overall rates of growth 
for Cases 19 and 20 are about the same. In general, the result of 
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Table Vl-5. Percentage change in net worth 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Overall 
1 8.9 9.8 9.9 9 . 8 20 . 6 74 .3 
2 8 .4 8.3 8 . 7 7.3 15 .o 57.5 
3 7. 0 14 . 3 12. 7 11. 3 15.9 77 .6 
4 9.6 13.1 12 .1 12 . 1 17 . 9 84 .1 
5 10 . 4 14.5 10.8 11.5 26.2 97 .2 
6 10.8 18.4 8 . 3 12 .6 10. 7 77 .1 
7 11.2 18.2 11.9 13 . 4 16 . 8 95.1 
8 9 . 3 14.9 12.8 12 . 8 23 . 0 96.6 
9 8. 6 12.1 12. 4 11.9 15.8 77 . 5 
10 10.5 13. 2 12 . 3 11.2 21.6 87.6 
11 10 .5 13.8 10.6 15.0 19.8 91. 7 
12 10.6 16.6 16.6 9.4 11 .1 83.1 
13 11.1 17.5 17. 7 9.8 13.7 91. 7 
14 10 .5 18.0 17.2 9.4 27. 7 113. 7 
15 12 . 1 19.7 13 . 9 7.3 13 . 2 85 . 8 
16 12 . 9 21. 8 16 . 6 8.2 13 .0 96.2 
17 7. 4 19 . 7 18 . 2 9 .0 25.2 107 . 6 
18 8.7 15 . 7 14.1 7.7 12.9 74 . 6 
19 10.0 17.1 13 . 7 5 . 2 17. 7 81.6 
20 9.6 11.5 10.1 8 . 7 23 .8 81.0 
21 10.7 21.8 19. 3 10 . 6 17 . 4 109.0 
22 9.9 22.9 19. 7 10 . 8 22 .5 119.5 
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Table VI-5 . Continued. 
Case Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Overall 
23 11. 4 20 . 8 18.6 9 . 6 31.0 129 .2 
24 13 . 7 23.8 19.0 8.1 14.2 107.0 
25 11.9 29 . 3 20.8 9.3 18.6 126 . 0 
26 7.3 21. 3 18.7 10. 7 35 . 2 131.0 
27 6 . 4 15 . 8 16.4 10 .8 18 .1 87.8 
28 7.0 19 .0 16 . 7 7. 8 20.1 92.1 
29 7.2 14.7 15 .4 9.5 26.8 97 .1 
30 11. 8 22.2 20 . 3 10.2 14.0 106 .7 
31 11.2 24.8 21.8 11.4 20.5 12 7 .0 
32 10.5 17 . 7 18.3 6 .5 40.8 130 . 7 
33 50 .6 45.7 29.3 16.5 12 .8 273 .2 
34 46.5 48.2 39 . 6 19.6 13 . 2 310. 3 
35 42.1 46 .9 42.9 22.0 14 .1 315.2 
36 62 . 3 51.8 30.8 13.5 16 . 8 327 .1 
37 57 . 5 60.4 40.3 20.4 14.0 386 . 7 
38 53.0 60. 3 46.4 21.9 14. 3 400.3 
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increasing the beginning equity decreases both the average rate of return 
and the growth rate of net worth with a given set of contract terms. 
In summary, with a given set of contract terms, changing the initial 
equity level results in a general pattern of change in financial indica-
tors. The fi rm's exposure to financial risk, its rate of return on equity, 
and its rate of growth of net worth were increased as the initial equity 
was decreased. 
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CHAPTER VII. IMPACT OF VARYING CONTRACT TERMS 
Eleven different sets of contract terms were imposed on the model. 
These are compared in this chapter by examining their impact on the crit 
ical beginning equity level and by comparing the different contracts at 
the same beginning equity level with the five financial indicators. 
Critical Equity Levels 
Table Vll-1 shows the critical beginning equity levels for the eleven 
contracts. It is evident from these results that adjusting land contract 
terms can have a large impact on the level of beginning net worth needed 
by the contract buyer. Contracts 1, 2, and 3 specify a twenty percent down 
payment and amortization of principal for fourteen years. Contract 1 uses 
the Springfield Plan of amortization and has the highest critical begin-
ning equity level. Since this set of contract terms requires the highest 
t otal payment and the highest principal payment in the initial years of 
any of the eleven contracts analyzed, it is logical that it would require a 
large equity base in order to create a sufficient repayment capacity. This 
set of contract terms is close to what an average land contract in Boone 
Cotmty would specify. The land contract buyer would need at least $87,110 
to successfully meet the obligations imposed by these terms under the con-
ditions assumed by the model. 
Contract 2 uses the Standard Plan of amortization. The critical 
beginning equity level drops by $25,140 to $61,970 from the critical level 
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Table VII-1. Critical beginning equities 
Contract Cd ti cal Level 
1 $87 ,110 
2 $61,9 70 
3 $47,158 
4 $66,448 
5 $48,178 
6 $46,938 
7 $63,888 
8 $41,086 
9 $37, 332 
10 $54, 369 
11 $37, 724 
12 $37,332 
req uired for Contract 1 . The only difference in the two contracts is the 
plan of amortization . In the initial years, this contract requires a lower 
total payment as well as lower before-tax profits to pay the principal 
portion. 
The use of Contract 3 with an Increasing Plan of amortization reduces 
the critical beginning equity t o $47,158 which is $14,812 below the level 
required by the Standard Plan and $39,952 below the level required by the 
Springfield Plan. This reduction is caused by a further reduction of the 
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total payment and by a decrease in the amount of before-tax profits that 
must be generated i n order to have sufficient after-tax income to pay the 
principal on the land contract in the first years. Both this plan and the 
Standard Plan allow the firm to create the additional repayment capacity 
needed in s ubsequent years by investing excess income in earlier years. 
In the case of the Springfield Plan this strategy is not possible since 
the largest payment occurs in the first year and the size of the payment 
becomes smaller in each succeeding year. 
Contracts 4, 5, and 6 also require a twenty percent down payment, 
but amortization is for twen t y years. The Springfield Plan of amortization 
is used in Contract 4 which has a critical level of $66,448. This level 
is $20,662 below that of Contract 1 which differs only in the length of 
amortization. Contract 4 has lower principal payments which l owers the 
total payment due and decreases the amoun t of before-tax income that must 
be generated to pay the principal. 
Changing to a Standard Plan of amortization decreases the critical 
beginning equity level to $48,178. This is $18,270 less than Contract 4 
which uses the Springfield Plan and $12,792 less than Contract 2 which is 
amor tized in fourteen years. In both cases, the reduction is caused by a 
decrease in the size of the total and principal payments due each year . 
Contract 6 uses the Increasing Plan of amortization, but does not 
result in large reductions of the critical beginning equity from those 
needed by Contracts 5 or 3. Its critical level of $46,938 is only $1,140 
less than that of Contract S, and $220 less than that for Contract 3. The 
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reason that this change does not greatly reduce the critical initial 
equity level is that there is a floor of $46,938 under which it cannot go 
without reducing the size of the down payment. This floor consists of 
the contract down payment, the owner 's minimum consumption requirement, 
and the fixed costs for assets. 
The size of the down payment is reduced to fifteen percent in 
Contracts 7, 8, and 9 while the amortization period is kept at twenty 
years. This results in further reductions in the critical equity level 
for all three contracts . The result of this change is to reduce the floor 
under which the critical beginning equity cannot go while a t the same 
time increasing the total annual payment and both its interest and princi-
pal components. The size of the payments for the different amortization 
plans follow the same pattern as in previous cases. 
Contract 7 is amortized on the Springfield Plan and has a critical 
beginning equity level of $63,888. This is a reduction of $2,560 attribu-
table t o the reduction in the size of the down payment. For Contract 8 
which uses the Standard Plan, this difference is $7,092. For Contract 9, 
with the increasing Plan, the difference is $9,606. The close r the con-
tract was to the floor level of initial equity with a twenty percent down 
payment, the greater was the reduction in critical initial equity achieved 
by reducing the down payment to fifteen percent . While Contract 7 re-
qui red a smaller down payment, it required more investment in the first 
year to create a repayment capacity sufficient to handle the higher annual 
con tract payments. Reducing the down payment by five percent in Contracts 
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8 and 9 from that required by Contracts 5 and 6 caused a greater decline 
in the critical beginning equity because little or no additional invest-
ment was needed to create the needed repayment capacity in the first 
years. 
Contracts 10 through 12 are amortized for twenty-five years, have a 
down payment of fifteen percent, and are amortized with the Springfield 
Plan, Standard Plan, and Increasing Payment Plan respectively. The begin-
ning equity level for Contract 10 was reduced by $9,519 from that for 
Contract 7 which is amortized for five less years. In the case of Con-
tract 11 this reduction is $3,362. The reduction is lower because the 
critical beginning equity level was close to the floor level with Contract 
8 . Contract 12 was not imposed on the model because the same set of terms 
with five less years of amortization in Contract 9 showed the beginning 
equity level t o be at the floor level dictated by the down payment, fixed 
costs, and consumption in the first year. 
These results are significant because they demonstrate that by 
changing the land contract terms from those typically found, the use of 
land contracts to acquire a farm can be made possible for farmers with much 
lower equities. This is evidenced by the fact that the lowest critical 
level of initial equity, that for Contract 9, is less than half the high-
est cri tical initial equity, that for Contract 1. Changing the plan of 
amortization has the greatest impact on the critical beginning equity . 
Also, by stre tching out the period of amortization, significant reductions 
are achieved. Reducing the size of the down payment has a smaller impact 
since it results in higher annual payments. 
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Financial Indicators 
The current ratios, which were shown in Table VI-1, conform to the 
same relationship that was found in the previous chapte r. This relation-
ship was that as the initial equity level was increased from the critical 
level, the current ratio increased also. If different contracts are com-
pared at the same equity level, the case that it is furthest from the 
cri tical level for its contract will have the highest current ratios. The 
case closest to the critical level will have the lowest current ratios. 
For example, of the four cases at the $80,000 level of beginning equity, 
Case 15 has the highest current ratios. Its beginning equity level is 
$33,062 above the critical level for Contract 6. By adjusting the contract 
terms in the right direction, a land contract buyer with a given equity can 
improve his liquidity position and thus provide greater protection against 
forfeiture of the land contracts. 
Of the cases that were at the critical level of beginning equity, 
those cases which required the lowest annual contract payments had higher 
current ratios than those which had higher annual payments. Thus, the 
critical level for Contract 6 had higher current ratios than did any of 
the other contracts at the critical level while Contract 1 had the lowest 
current ratios . This relation arises because the greater annual contract 
payments require a greater repayment capacity. Greater repayment capacity 
is achieved by investment in non-current assets. If the acquisition of 
these assets is financed with intermediate term credit, an additional cur-
rent liability is added to the balance sheet which reduces the current 
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ratio even more. This relation implies that the gradual building of 
repayment capacity from the firm's savings that occurs when the amount of 
income needed to meet the land contract payments increases over time allows 
the firm to have a better liquidity position in the initial years. Use 
of the Springfield Plan, however, tends to reduce the current liquidity of 
the firm because it requires a greater investment in non-current assets. 
A general pattern is less easy to find in the case of the coverage 
ratios which were shown in Table VI-2. With a given beginning equity 
level, the coverage ratios increase a.s the difference between the critical 
beginning equity level and the actual level increases. Contract 7 at the 
$80,000 and $70,000 beginning equity levels does not conform to this pat-
tern . This is because of the higher annual payments required by this con-
tract. In most cases, the contract buyer can improve his protection 
against not having enough income in a year to meet the contract and other 
obligations by changing contracts at a given equity level. This parallels 
the imp lications given by the current ratios. 
The coverage ratios at the critical equity levels show no definite 
pattern. The highest ratios occur with Contract 4, followed by Contracts 
11, 9, 5, 8, 10, 6, 7, 2, 3, and 1. 
The debt-equity ratio is influenced by different sets of contract 
terms. Two factors affect it at a given level . The rate at which debt is 
retired has a direct affect on the level of this ratio . The Springfield 
Plan will lead to a faster reduction in it while the Increasing Payment 
Plan will keep the ratio much higher. Reducing the down payment also will 
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increase the ratio and prevent it from decreasing as quickly. The lowest 
debt-equity ratio achieved was with Contract 1 which used the Springfield 
Plan of amortization. The highest ratios were at the critical beginning 
equity levels for Contracts 8, 9, and 11. If the contract buyer wishes to 
achieve a lower debt-equity ratio, the land contract terms can be adjusted 
to accomplish this. At a given beginning equity level, attempts to reduce 
the debt-equity ratio by changing the land contract terms will also reduce 
the current ratio. These ratios were shown in Table VI-3. 
The particular set of contract terms that is chosen at a given level 
of beginning equity will affect the average rate of return. First, the 
difference between the initial equity and the critical level for the con-
tract will affect the rate of return by constraining the amount of funds 
available to the firm. Second, the rate at which the land contract princi-
pal is amortized will affect both the buyer's equity level and the amount 
of interest that he pays on the contract. For this study, a proper rate 
of return cannot be specified. This will vary for individuals depending 
on the alternatives open to them for investing their funds elsewhere and 
on the amount of compensation needed to adjust for the risk involved with 
the use of the funds. 
With a given beginning equity, the land contract buyer may wish to 
choose the set of contract terms that allows him to earn the highest rate 
of return. For example, of the three cases that are at the $90,000 begin-
ning equity level, Case 1 has the highest rates of return. It has a 
Springfield Plan of amortization which results in a quicker retirement of 
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debt and lower interest payments. The highest rates of return for the 
cases at the beginning equity levels of $80,000 and $70,000 are earned by 
cases with Contract 4 which also uses the Springfield Plan of amortization. 
The faster retirement of land contract debt appears to have a favorable 
impact on the rate of return . This conclusion does not consider the un-
favorable impact of the contracts which retire debt faster on the current 
liquidity of the firm. Table VI-4 showed the rates of return. 
The overall rate of growth for net worth also varies among contracts 
at a given beginning equity level. The buyer who wishes to maximize the 
growth of his equity can do so by changing his land contract terms. For 
example, of the six cases at the $70,000 level of beginning equity, Case 
16 provides the greatest growth of net worth. It should be noted that 
maximization of the rate of growth of net worth does not conflict with the 
goal of high current liquidity in most cases. The highest growth rates 
also usually occur when the Increasing Plan of amortization is used. Be-
cause of this, these higher rates of growth indicate that more of the 
increase in net worth is in non-land assets . 
The growth of net worth at the critical beginning equities also varies 
as can be seen in Table VI-5 . In general, net worth grows the least when 
the Springfield Plan is used. There is little difference in growth between 
the other two amortization plans at the same down payment and period of 
amortization, but as the size of the down payment is decreased and the 
period of amortization is extended, the rate of growth rises. 
The analysis demonstrates that different sets of contract terms have 
diffe rent impacts on the critical beginning equity level. It also shows 
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that different sets of land contract terms have an impact on the current 
ratio, coverage ratio, debt-equity ratio, average rate of return, and 
gr owth of net worth when the beginning equity level is held constant or 
when it is at the criti cal level. When the contract buyer can influence 
the terms of the land contract during the negotiations with the seller, he 
has an oppo rtunity to improve the contract's impact on his farm business. 
Adjusting the contract terms in a particular direction, however, may 
have both favo rable and unfavorable effects. 
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CHAPTER VIII. IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE PRICE LEVEL 
Cases 33 through 38 are solutions obtained by using the actual farm 
prices received in 1973 in the model. Contract 1 was imposed on the firm 
in Cases 33 through 35 and Contract 7 in Cases 36 through 38. With both 
contracts, the critical beginning equity level occurred at the floor level 
set by fixed costs and consumption for the first year and the contract 
down payment. This level is $46,938 for Contract 1 and $37,332 for Con-
tract 7. Since these two contracts require the highest payments in the 
initial years of all the contracts considered in this study, the other con-
tracts would all have a critical beginning equity level at the floor level 
with this set of prices. 
The six cases that represent solutions with 1973 prices have a general 
pattern of production activities. The rotation of corn and soybeans using 
Eq uipment 2 and 3 are the only crop activities used and the two activities 
that farrow two litters of pigs each year are the only livestock activi-
ties used. The amount of crops grown ranges from 259 acres to 413 acres 
and is generally greater than the amount grown in those cases using the 
lower set of farm prices. There are two reasons for this . First, higher 
earnings allowed more and earlier investment in Equipment 3 which uses the 
least labor per acre in the harvest season when labor is a limiting re-
source . The second reason is that no feeder pigs are grown in these solu-
tions which allows more labor to be used in crop activities. Since more 
crops are grown, more land is rented in these cases also. Between 70 and 
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224 acres of land are rented in these cases. This is shown in Table V-5. 
After the first year, all of these cases approach a level of crop activi-
ties of s l ightly over 300 acres. The lower initial equities do not 
achieve these levels until Year 3 when enough of Equipment 3 is acquired 
t o grow this level of crops. The levels of crop activities are shown in 
Table V-2. 
The onl y livestock activities used in the solutions at 1973 prices 
were those which farrowed two litters of pigs per year . In the first year 
of the solutions not at the critical beginning equity level, 22 litters 
were farrowed. The two solutions which occur at the critical beginning 
equity level did not have any litters farrowed in the first year because 
no funds were available for investing in hog finishing facilities. Start-
ing in the second year, all solutions invested in far r owing and finishing 
facilities to provide capacity for 150 litters of pigs per year. In the 
fif th year, all solutions invested in additional farrowing facilities 
which were only used for farrowing two litters instead of four. This 
a llowed the farrowing of 159 litters in the fifth year in all solutions. 
Table V-3 shows the amount of litters farrowed in each year . 
Both short and intermediate credit activities were important in 
financing the firm's production activities in these solutions . The use 
of short te rm credit occurred over a wider range of levels in the six 
solutions than it did in the solutions at the trend price level. In the 
first year, use is generally lower because only 22 litters of pigs were 
gr own which reduced the need for financing the purchase of corn . Most of 
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the solutions at the trend price level grew feeder pigs in the first year 
which required the purchase of corn, and in turn the use of short term 
credit. The level of credit use is much higher in both the second and 
fifth years since more litters of pigs were raised which required the pur-
chase of corn. Because corn was more expensive with this set of prices, 
more credit was required. The solutions with initial equities not at the 
critical level were able to greatly reduce the amotmt of short term credit 
used in the third and fourth years as corn was inventoried and cash was 
accumulated. Use rises in the fifth year due to the conve rsion of short 
term assets to longer term assets. The levels for this activity are shown 
in Table V-6. 
The use of intermediate term credit was at a larger level and was 
generally used earlier with the 1973 price level than with the trend price 
level. The higher prices created a much higher repayment capacity and 
thus allowed greater use of this activity in order to acquire productive 
assets. The amount of funds borrowed in the final year was generally less 
than with those solutions at the trend price level because more assets 
were accumulated in earlier years and more cash was available. Table V-7 
shows the levels for this activity. 
The amotmt of unused labor is shown in Table V-8. For the six cases 
in which 1973 farm prices were used, these amounts are greater for the 
first three periods in the first year than for cases using the trend prices. 
This is because feeder pigs were not grown in the former cases. Non-use 
of labor was nearly eliminated when farrowing facilities were acquired in 
the second year. 
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For Contract 1, the critical beginning equity level is in Case 2 for 
the trend price set and in Case 35 for the 1973 price set. Case 20 and 
Case 38 are at the critical initial equity level for Contract 7 with trend 
prices and 1973 prices respectively. The critical levels that occur with 
1973 prices have higher current ratios, higher coverage ratios, higher 
rates of return, and much larger changes in net worth . The debt-equity 
ratios for Cases 35 and 38 are much higher in the first two years than for 
Cases 2 and 20 respec t ively, but decline to the same general level in the 
final year. This is caused by greater intermediate term borrowing in the 
first two years in Cases 35 and 38. The other four financial indicators 
are higher because of the higher net cash flows resulting from the higher 
farm pr ices. 
The important i mplication of the discussion of this chapter is that 
the level of future prices would have a large impact on the success or 
failure of the contract buyer over a certain range of initial equities 
fo r certai n contracts . In the two contracts that were tested with bo th 
levels of prices , large gaps exist between the critical initial equities 
for the two price levels. The gap for Contract 1 is $40,172 and for Con-
tract 7 is $26,556. Over these ranges of beginning equities, a contract 
buyer would be s uccessful if 1973 prices were realized, but would fail to 
meet his financial obligations if farm prices fell to the level of the 
historical trend. This gap is lower for the other contracts that have 
been considered i n this study. This is because the critical beginning 
equities are closer t o the floor level of beginning equi t y in the cases 
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using trend prices while all contracts would be at the floor level if 1973 
prices were used. Contracts 6, 9, and 12 would be successful at either 
price level since the critical beginning equity level is at the floor level 
with either set of prices. Thus, the low-equity contract buyer can adjust 
for uncertainty regarding future prices by two me thods that have been con-
sidered in this study. First, an initial equity can be accumulated which 
will guarantee success with either set of prices. This may required de-
laying the purchase of a farm for several years. A more attractive alter-
native may be to adjust the contract terms so that the land contract is 
flexib le enough to allow s uccess over a broad range of price l evels. When 
the seller will permit such adjustment, this alternative does not require 
delaying the purchase of farm land . 
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CHAPTER IX . CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews and s ummarizes the results of this study in terms 
of the objectives that were stated in Chapter I and with respect to the 
hypotheses that were put forth in Chapter II. 
Success and Failure Elements in Land Contract Use 
The first objective was to examine the use of land contracts on an ex 
ante basis in order to discover success and failure elements in their use. 
Four hypotheses were advanced in order to guide the inquiry. 
Hypothesis l 
This hypothesis investigated the ability of the firm to meet its 
financial obligations under two different sets of prices. Prices realized 
in 1973 were compared to those that would be realized if commodity prices 
returned to the level of their historic trend. It was found that the 
impact varied among contracts, but with those contracts which imposed 
large principal payments in the initial years, the impact was the greatest. 
There was no difference in the beginning equity level necessary for suc-
cess i n several contracts where the annual principal payment increased over 
the years from low levels in the first year. Land con tract buyers who 
enter into contracts with certain sets of terms would be successful under 
one set of prices, but not under a lower set of prices over a certain 
range of initial equities. This points to a need for land contract buyers 
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t o consider two points be fore entering into a land contract. First, the 
level of expected future prices that can reasonably be expected relative 
to the financial obligations imposed by the land contract should be in-
ves tigated. Second, alternatives should be considered which provide flexi-
bility when future incomes are lower than expected . 
Hypothesis £ 
This hypothesis asked what the beginning equity level for a land 
contract buyer would need t o be in order for the farm business to generate 
s ufficient income. This varied as the terms of the contract and the price 
l evels were varied. The critical levels for the twelve contracts when 
prices based on the historical trend a re used are shown in Table VII-1. 
The critical levels for the two contracts that were tested at 1973 price 
levels are stated in the text of Chapter IX. The critical equity levels 
occurred over a range of $49,778 fo r the twelve contracts that were tested 
at the trend price level. The range is $9,606 for the two contracts 
tested at the 19 73 pri ce level. Since both these contracts impose the 
greatest principal payments in the initial years at the two levels of con-
tract down payment and are at the floor level of beginning equity, the 
other ten contracts wo uld also have critical initial equities falling at 
one or the o ther extreme of this range . Especially at lower price levels, 
the terms of the land contract can be adjusted to make their successful 
use possible for farmers with lower beginning equities. This can make the 
goal of land ownership possible for low-equity farmers sooner than would 
otherwise be possible. 
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Hypothesis 1 
The sensitivity o f a land contract buyer's business to downward income 
f luctuation is examined by Hypothesis 3 . Three financial indicators were 
generated in order to give an indication of this. In terms of the current 
ratio, three factors were found to i ncrease this ratio , and thus the firm ' s 
ability to wi thstand income stress . First, with the same set of land con-
trac t terms, increasing the beginning equity level caused the current ratio 
t o be higher. Second, when different contracts are compared at the same 
equity level, those cases which have beginning equity levels that are 
f urthest from the critical level for the particular contract have the high-
est current ratios . Finally, the current ratios for cases at the critical 
initial eq uity level were higher for contracts with increasing annual 
principal payments than for con tracts with constant annual p rincipal pay-
ments. This relation was caused by the fact that with constant annual 
principal payments, a high deb t repayment capacity was needed in the first 
years which was created by investment in intermediate terms assets at the 
start of the first year. Th ose contracts which required increasing annual 
principal payments gradually built debt repayment capacity out of retained 
earnings rather than from the initial equity. Retained earnings were cur-
rent assets fo r at least one year prior to being invested, and thus had a 
positive impact onthe current ratio. While continued income stress in 
several years might interfere wi th the bui l ding of repayment capaci t y lead-
ing t o de f ault on the contract in these cases, the building of repayment 
capacity with retained earnings does all ow more flexibility and more 
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protection if income stress occurs in a single year due t o reduced crop 
yields or abnormally low prices. 
The coverage ratios also showed a pattern of change as beginning 
equity and contract terms were varied. The coverage ratios were generally 
higher as the initial equity was increased above the minimum level 
required for success. The ratio was less than one in some years for the 
beginning equity levels that were not at the critical level, while at the 
critical level they tended to be at one or slightly above in most years . 
This illustrates the greater dependence of cases at the critical begin-
ning equity level on the generation of sufficient cash flows, and thus 
the greater threat posed by income stress. Comparing different contracts 
at a given beginning equity level generally showed that the further a par-
ticular case was from the critical beginning equity level required by the 
given contract, the higher were its coverage ratios. The results for the 
coverage ratios are similar to those for the current ratios. 
The debt-equity ratios reflected the impact of different beginning 
equity levels and different contract terms in the manner that would be ex-
pected. Increasing the level of beginning equity while hilding the con-
tract terms constant caused lower debt-equity ratios. The rate at which 
the land contract 's payment plan retired the debt also affected this ratio . 
The contract with the highest annual principal payments caused lower debt-
equity ratios while the contracts with the lowest annual principal pay-
ments in the first years caused the ratio to be high and to decline more 
slowly. Decreasing the down payment for the land contract also caused the 
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ratio to be higher. While lowering the debt-equity ratio decreases the 
proportion of fixed financial charges that the firm must pay from the 
annual returns on its assets, it also causes the firm to have a lower cur-
rent liquidity as reflected by t he current ratio at a given beginning 
equity level. This indicates that there is a tradeoff between these two 
i ndicators of financial strength. 
Hypothesis !!. 
The final hypothesis guided the inq uiry into determining the impact 
of changing the down payment, the amortization plan, or the length of 
amortization for the land contract. Changing the contract terms affected 
both the required level of beginning equity and the rate at which the land 
contract buyer's net wor th grew. 
Of the twelve contracts that were considered in this study , two 
different down payments, three different lengths of amortization , and three 
different plans of amortization are represented . Starting with the con-
tracts which have the higher down payment and the shortest length of amor-
tization, substantial decreases in the critical initial equity level occur-
red as the plan of amortization was changed from Springfield to Standard 
to Increasing Plans. When the length of amortization was lengthened or 
the down payment decreased, changing from the Springfield Plan to the Stan-
dard Plan resulted in further decreases of the ini t ial equity level crucial 
to success, but little change in it occurred by changing from t he Standard 
to the Increasing Plan. 
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Holding the down payment and plan of amortization constant, 
lengthening the amortization period caused the cri tical initial equity 
level to decline significantly for the Springfield Plan contracts, some-
what less for the Standard Plan contracts, and slightly or not at all for 
the Increasing Plan contracts. This pattern is reversed when the down pay-
ment is decreased while holding the other factors constant. The decrease 
in critical beginning equity level is largest for the contract using the 
Increasing Plan and smallest for the contract using the Springfield Plan . 
Of the cases that were not at the critical beginning equity level, 
the highest rates of growth of net worth were achieved using the Increasing 
Plan of amortization. For those cases at the critical beginning equity 
level, the rate of growth was smallest when the Springfield Plan of amor-
tization was used, but did not greatly differ between the other two plans. 
Holding the plan of amortization constant and increasing the length of 
amortization or decreasing the size of the down payment also caused higher 
rates of growth. The rate of growth is influenced in two ways. First, 
the rate at which the land contract debt is required will affect it. 
Second, the rate of return on equity will influence it. The results indi-
cated that cases with lower initial equities earned higher rates of return . 
The above relations conform to a pattern of higher rates of growth as the 
contracts are varied to require lower initial equities. This suggests that 
the higher rates of growth occur more because of the initial equity level 
than because of the rate of land contract debt retirement. 
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These conclusions indicate t hat changing contract terms and beginning 
equity levels can have a substantial impact on land con tract use by low-
equity farmers. These results will be applied in the next sect ion. 
Improving Land Contract Use 
The findings of this study may be used to improve the use of land 
contracts by low-equity farmers in acquiring owner ship of farm land. For 
a given set of contract terms, increasing the buyer's initial equity level 
will improve his chances of s uccessfully completing the terms of the land 
contract and acquiring full ownership of the land. This alternative may 
be unappealing to potential buyers since it involves waiting while the 
higher equity l e vel is acquired . In addition, the benefits of this 
strategy may be negated if land prices are on the increase as they have 
been in recent years. When the seller of land is willing to negotiate the 
terms of the land contract with the buyer, there is an opportunity for the 
low-eq uity buyer to either acquire land at an earlier date than he other-
wise could, or t o improve the tolerance of his business to i n come stress 
after entering into the contract without increasing his initial equity. 
When the sellers are inflexible in setting contract terms and require a 
contract s uch as Contract 1, whi ch reflects the terms of the average land 
contract in Boone County, Iowa, the buyer will have no options i n this 
area . 
Most fa rm businesses grow over a period of years as earnings from the 
business are retained and reinvested. This will be especiall y true for 
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farmers who are getting started in business and who because of this, have 
not acquired ownership of large amounts of assets. For this group of po-
tential land contract buyers, the Springfield Plan of amortization is 
poorly suited. Total payments decline over time, and thus the large pay-
ments must be made prior to the time when the firm can use its retained 
earnings t o bui ld up its debt repayment capacity. While this plan mini-
mizes the amount of interest paid on the land contract, this may not be a 
relevant goal for low-equity land contract buyers unless funds can be 
obtained in the desired quantities elsewhere at a lower cost. When faced 
with a higher cost of funds and/or external capital rationing, it is 
desirable for the low-equity buyer to use either the Standard or Increas-
ing Payment Plan . This will be especially so when the land contract 
allows prepayment of principal. The building of debt repayment capacity 
also causes the firm 's current liquidity to be higher in the initial 
years which gives added protection against income stress. 
Land contract buyers with low equities would be well advised to 
increase the period of amortization and to reduce the size of down payment. 
The benefits of either of these will depend upon the plan of amortization 
being used. If the seller insists on the Springfield Plan and a given 
length of amortization, there is little to be gained from a smaller down 
payment. In general, adjusting the contract terms to require smaller 
principal payments in the initial years will be to his benefit . 
For the land contract buyer who is uncertain as to the level of future 
farm prices, there exists the possibility of obtaining a land contract 
which could be successfully completed under a wide range of prices . 
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Failure to carefully consider the level of future prices relative to the 
obligations imposed by the contract could create a situation where the 
buyer was forced to forfeit the land contract . 
The fact that the objectives of buyers and sellers will often conflict 
as the terms of the land contract are negotiated suggests that there is a 
need for financial intermediation in the use of land contracts. If the 
land contract instruuent can be adapted so that financial intermediaries 
can be involved in i ts use, the tax and income objectives of the seller 
need not conflict with the low-equity buyer's need for a low down payment 
and lower payments in the early years. 
Performance of the Model 
As indicated previously, there were some problems with the model due 
to its propensity to convert current assets to longer term assets in the 
final year. However, the need for large cash flows to pay the contract 
obligations forced the model to generate realistic results in the other 
years. Also, the solutions that were at the critical level of initial 
equity were less distorted in the final year. Two factors contributed to 
the problem in the fifth year. First, in many solutions, by the time of 
the fifth year the firm had acquired all the intermediate term assets that 
it could use, given its supply of labor. The assets accumulated would be 
used if more labor was available starting in the fifth year. The second, 
and more i mportant influence was that cash that existed after the fifth 
year had no value in the objective f i.mction. Placing a value on it as to 
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what it would earn in the future, appropriately discounted, would help to 
eliminate the problem of the final year. Since the problem that was being 
investigated was concerned primarily with the generation of adequate cash 
flows, the unrealistic pattern of investment that occurred in the final 
year does not affect the conclusions of this study. 
Certain steps could be taken to improve the accuracy of the model. 
The parameters for intermediate term credit may overly restrict its use. 
However, the amount of intermediate term credit was internally restricted 
in many solutions bv debt repayment capacity, and not be availability of 
cash for collateral. More information is needed concerning the parameters 
that determine the availability of credit from institutions such as Pro-
duction Credit Associations, corrunercial banks, and. the Farmers Home 
Administration. 
Certain adjustments and additions could be made to the model which 
would increase its size and the cost of obtaining solutions. First, the 
corn inventory could be used as a source of collateral for obtaining 
credit. This would eliminate the buying of corn in Years 2 through 5 
caused by selling of corn in the previous year to meet financial obliga-
tions. Second, additional activities could be made available, especially 
in the later years. Since labor is a limiting resource in the harvest 
season for each year, an activity that would allow the hiring of addition-
al labor either on a full time or part time basis would expand the options 
of the firm in later years. Third, the cash flows are aggregated into one 
year periods in this model. Disaggregation into seasonal flows would give 
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a better indication of the seasonal needs for short term credit and would 
allow a more accurate calculation of the costs of short term credit. 
Finally, the use of a progressive income tax rate structure in the model 
would give more accurate income tax liabilities. However, as shown in 
Table A-11 , the use of a single rate does not greatly distort the liability 
since the rates change very slowly. 
Further Research 
There are several areas in which further research into the use of 
land contracts by low- equity farmers might be useful . As mentioned in the 
previous section, more information concerning the factors that affect the 
decisions of lenders when they deal with low-equity land contract buyers 
would be useful to any further studies. Further studies might take the 
same approach as this study, but investigate land contract use in other 
economic regions of Iowa where physical parameters and land prices are di f-
fe rent. The length of the model could also be extended and additional 
ac tivities could be added. This would be especially useful for investi-
gating the impact of a land contract that had a balloon payment . 
The most important area for further research is to study the impact 
of changing land con tract terms on the seller. This study has not con-
sidered the impact of changing the land contract terms on the seller . Not 
only will the level of total income from the land con tract vary as the 
terms are changed, but the annual income tax liability will vary as well. 
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A contract that will provide a given level of lncome desi red by the seller 
can be imposed on the model. If the income from the land contract was the 
only source of income t o the seller, the income from interest and capital 
gains could be taxed within the linear programming model. The income tax 
liability would then be deducted from the seller's income. An equality 
const raint on annual after-tax income would mean that the seller would have 
the desired income he wished t o have. This fo r mulation would require two 
sets of additional activities in each year, additional rows to accumulate 
income from capital gains, interest, and non-taxable principal income, 
restraints t o require the payment of income taxes in each year, and some 
flexibility in the length of amorti zation and the level of payments in the 
final years. A set of activities would allow a progressive tax rate on 
the seller's income subject to taxes. 
In addition to requiring a minimum level of annual income for the 
seller from the land contract, the above formulation could also be 
adapted to include a prepayment privilege. The equality constraint on 
after-tax income would be changed t o a minimum constraint a nd the amount 
of prepayment privilege would be a maximum constraint on the amount of 
principal repayment in each year. The length of amortization could be 
left open under this formula tion. The size of down payment could also 
be endogenously determined by this type of formulation within constraints 
set by the seller. Such formulations of the linear prograrmning model 
would allow contract payments that are best for the land contract buyer 
given the requirements imposed by t he land contract seller. 
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This concludes t his chapter and the study. The importance of land 
contrac t use in Iowa points t o a need to know the impact of such use on 
both t he buyer and the seller. It is the author's hope that this study 
has produced additional information concerning the use of land contracts 
by l ow-equity buyers both in prospect as well as in retrospect. 
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APPENDIX: PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL 
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Table A-1. Coefficients for crop activities fertilizer and limestone use 
Nitrogen 
Phosphorus 
Potassium 
Limestone 
Crop Yieldsb 
Activity 
Corn 1 
Corn 2 
Com 3 
ccs 1 
ccs 2 
ccs 3 
a(5). 
b (5). 
Cost Per 
Pound 
.055 
.105 
.054 
.003 
Corn 
108 
108 
108 
216 
216 
216 
Continuous 
Corn 
130 
40 
80 
272 
Quantitya 
ccs 
Rotation 
250 
110 
160 
510 
Soybeans 
36 
36 
36 
Table A-1. Continued. 
Variable costs 
Coste 
Seed 
Herbicide 
Insecticide 
Drying 
Fertilizer and Limed 
Limestone 
Diesel Fuel e 
Other 
Fertilizer Applicationf 
Lubrication Costsg 
Total 
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Continuous Corn 
$ 7 .59 
4 .9 7 
. 99 
2.39 
7.15 
4.20 
4.32 
. 82 
1. 71 
. 86 
1.44 
.26 
$36 . 70 
cExcept where noted, all costs are from: (43) . 
d(5). 
e(13). 
f(39) . 
8(21, p. 125). 
CCS Rotation 
$22 .20 
16 . 24 
1.98 
4.78 
13. 75 
11 .55 
8 .64 
1.53 
5.03 
2.25 
2.88 
. 75 
$91.58 
Table A-1. Continued. 
Repair costs per acre 
Equipment System 
l 
2 
3 
Total variable costs 
Activity 
Corn 1 
Corn 2 
Corn 3 
ccs 1 
ccs 2 
ccs 3 
Gross returns 
Activity & 
Price Level 
Corn 1,2,&3 
Trend Prices 
1973 Prices 
ccs 1,2,&3 
Trend Prices 
19 73 Prices 
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Years 1-4 
$150 .12 
198.00 
Repair Costs Per Acreh 
$ 6.48 
8.20 
12.17 
Total Variable Costs 
$ 43.18 
44.90 
48.87 
110.43 
115.52 
127.60 
Year 5 
$170.64 
248.40 
491.40 
694.80 
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Table A-1. Continued. 
Net revenue 
Activity & 
Price Level Years 1-4 Year 5 
Corn 1 
Trend Prices $-43.18 $127.56 
1973 Prices -43.18 205.22 
Corn 2 
Trend Prices -44.90 125. 74 
1973 Prices -44.90 203.50 
Corn 3 
Trend Prices -48.87 121. 77 
1973 Prices -48.87 199 .53 
ccs 1 
Trend Prices 39.69 380.97 
1973 Prices 87 .57 584. 37 
ccs 2 
Trend Prices 34.60 375. 88 
1973 Prices 82.48 5 79 .28 
ccs 3 
Trend Prices 22.52 363. 80 
1973 Prices 70.40 567 .20 
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Table A-2. Labor requirements 
Activity Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Dec.-Mar. April-June July-Sept. Oct. & Nov. 
Corn la .21 1.63 . 56 2.34 
Corn 2 .21 1.45 .56 2. 30 
Corn 3 • 21 1.25 . 55 1.89 
ccs 1 .55 4 . 81 2.09 5.87 
ccs 2 . 53 4.41 2.05 5.74 
ccs 3 .52 3 . 83 1.82 4. 72 
Hog lb 9.15 6.03 6.23 3 . 34 
Hog 2 7.20 5.43 5.68 3.14 
Hog 3 2. 70 3.22 5.00 3.96 
Hog 4 9. 70 7.55 7.49 4. 76 
8 (21, p. 101). 
b(44, p. 107). 
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Table A-3. Variable costs, corn requirements, gross returns, and net 
returns for hog activites 
Variable Costsa Hog 1 Hog 2 Hog 3 Hog 4 
Purchase cost $ 690. 36b 
Supplements & Minerals $ 235.00 $ 235 .oo $ 117.50 238.95 
Breeding Charge 6.00 6.00 3.00 
Veterinary & Medical 31.00 31.00 15.50 51.90 
Machinery Variable Costs 54.00 54.00 27.00 57.00 
Miscellaneous 3.60 3.60 1.80 3.60 ----
Total $ 329.60 $ 329.60 $ 164.80 $1041.81 
Corn Requirement (Bushels) 202 202 102 321 
Yields 
Pigs weaned per unit 15 15 7.5 
Feeder pigs bought 30 
Market hogs sold 13.8 13.8 6.4 29.l 
\ 
Cwt. of pork soldc 30. 36 30 .36 14.08 64.02 
Cwt. of pork sold--sowd 4 4 4 
Gross Revenue Trend Pricese $ 956.85 $ 956.85 $ 494.33 $1818.81 
bWhen 1973 output prices are used, this cost is $939. 
~arket hogs are sold at 220 pounds each. 
dsow is sold after second farrowing at 400 pounds. The trend price is 
$23.58 per cwt. and the 1973 price is $32.03 per cwt. 
3. 
eA gilt is retained from each of the activity units for Hog 1, 2, and 
Table A-3. Continued. 
Net Revenue Trend Prices 
Gross Revenue 19 73 Prices 
Net Revenue 1973 Prices 
166 
Hog 1 Hog 2 
$ 627.25 $ 627 . 25 
1300.01 
970 . 41 
1300 .01 
970.41 
Hog 3 Hog 4 
$ 329.53 $ 777.00 
671.61 2471.16 
506. 81 1180. 71 
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Table A-4 . Machinery investment 
SI stem 1 Sistem 2 Sistem 3 
Equipment8 Type Price Type Price Type Price 
Disk 10 ft. $ 850 14 ft. $ 1,462 20 ft. $ 2. 759 
14 ft. 1,462 
Plow 4 Bottom 1,420 5 Bottom 2,000 7 Bottom 2,274 
Harrow 20 ft. 328 30 ft. 379 30 ft . 379 
Planter 4 row 1,949 6 row 2.923 8 row 4 ,114 
Cultivator 4 row 1,191 6 row 1,516 8 row 1, 732 
Rotary Hoe 4 row 758 6 row 1,083 8 row 1,299 
Sprayer 8 row 812 8 row 812 8 row 812 
Combine 4 row 12 '722 4 row 12, 722 large 24 ,500 
Corn Head 4 row 5 ,630 3 row 4 ,233 8 row 8. 745 
Tractor 3-4 plow 6,900 5-6 plow 12,500 6-8 plow 13,859 
4-5 plow 8,283 
Pickup 
Truck 3/4 ton 3,400 3/4 ton 3,400 3/4 ton 3,400 
Wagon 200 bu . 1,083 200 bu . 1,083 200 bu. 1,083 
Total $37,043 $44,113 $75, 780 
ac21 , pp. 121-122). 
168 
Table A-4 . Continued. 
Personal Property 
Taxb System 1 
Year 1 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 5 
Fixed Costs for Truck 
b(21, pp. 225-228). 
$ 
$ 
$ 
604 
490 
432 
366 
304 
287 per year 
System 2 
$ 703 
569 
498 
427 
356 
System 3 
$ 1 ,202 
967 
840 
714 
588 
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Table A-5. Hog facility investment activities 
Capacity 
Useful Life (years) 
Investment Cost 
Annual Depreciation 
Assessed Value for 
Property Taxes c 
Annual Personal 
Property Taxd 
Annual Repairs Coste 
Annual Insurance Premiumf 
Total Annual Fixed Costs 
a(44, p. 85) . 
b(21, p . 94). 
C(21, pp . 225-229) . 
d(21, pp . 225-229) . 
ec21, p. 159). 
fc21, p. 159). 
Swine 
Expansion 1 
Farrow 4 
litters per 
year 
20 
$720a 
$36 
$194.40 
$14.75 
$25.20 
$1.08 
$41.03 
Swine Swine 
Expansion 2 Expansion 3 
Finish 10 Farrow and 
pigs--3 Finish 1 
times per litter 
year 
5 10 
$69b $274b 
$13.80 $2 7 . 40 
$18.63 $73 . 98 
$1.41 $5 .61 
$2.41 $9.59 
$.10 $.41 
$3.92 $15. 61 
Table A-6. Fixed expenses 
Expense 
a Real Estate Taxes 
Insurance Costs 
Building Maintenance and Repairsb 
Contract Interest 
Intermediat~ Term Loan Interest 
a(21, p. 225; 19, p. 10). 
b(21, 159) p. • 
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Cost 
$2'164 
648 
686 
varies 
varies 
Table A-7. Consumption, principal repayment and partial rent repayment 
Expense Cost 
a Minimum Consumption 
Contract Principal 
Intermediate Term Principal Due 
Partial Rent 
($30 x Acres Rented in previous year) 
$5,014 
varies 
varies 
varies 
a(21, p. 254). The data was used to estimate a linear consumption 
function . The intercept estimate is used for minimum consumption, and 
the slope value is used for determining marginal consumption . 
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Table A-8. Estimation of the rate of return on machinery 
Resource 
Labor 
Operating Capital 
Land 
Machinery 
Depreciation 
Fixed Costs 
Total 
4. 74 Hrs. $5/Hr. 
$43.18 .15 
1 acre $60 
Net Revenue from Corn 1 (Trend Price) = $127. 46 
Net Revenue - Total Resource Value= Residual= $22.12 
Investment Cost = $160 
Residual Divided by Investment Cost $22.12/$160.00 
Annual Rate of Return= 13.8% 
.138 
aAmount of resources used is that for one tmit of Corn 1. 
Value 
$ 23.70 
3 .23 
60.00 
16 .00 
2.41 
$105.34 
bThe following costs are assumed: required rate of return on operat-
ing capital is 15% per year and labor is valued at $5.00 per hour. Land 
cost is represented by the cost of renting land. 
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Table A-9 . Estimate of the rate of return on Swine Expansion 1 and 2 
Resource Amount 8 Costb Value 
2 Gilts $125.00 15% $ 18. 75 
Operating Capital 329.60 15% 49.44 
Labor 46 .2 hrs. $5. 231.00 
Corn 404 bu. $1. 73 698.92 
Dep re cia ti on 50.00 
Fixed Costs 46.91 
Total $1095.02 
Net Revenue from Hog 1 and 2 = $1254.50 
Net Revenue - Total Resource Value= $159.48 =Residual 
Investment Cost = $823.50 
Residual Divided by Investment Cost = $159.48/$823.50 = .19 
Annual Rate of Return on Investment = 19% 
aThe amount of resources used by both Hog 1 and 2 are included in the 
calculations since the farrowing facilities can be used by both. To com-
plete the activities, 1.5 units of Swine Expansion 2 are required and these 
are included in the calculations. 
bThe following costs are assumed: required rate of return on operat-
ing capital and investment in gilts is 15% and labor is valued at $5/hour. 
The cost of buying corn is used to value the corn used. 
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Table A-10. Estimate of rate of return on Swine Expansion 3 
Amount ~ost a 
1 Gilt $62.50 .075% $ 4 .68 
Operating Capital $164. 80 .075% 12 . 36 
Labor 14. 88 hrs. $5/hr . 74 . 40 
Corn 102 bush. $1. 73 176.46 
Depreciation 27 .40 
Fixed Cos ts 15 .61 
Total $310.91 
Net Revenue from Hog 3 = $329.53 
Net Revenue - Total Resource Value $18.62 = Residual 
Investment Cost = $274.00 
Residual Divided by Investment Cost $18.62/$274.00 = .06 
Annual Rate of Return on Investment = 6% 
aThe following costs are assumed: required rate of return on invest-
ment in gilts and operating capital is 15% per annum and labor is valued 
at $5/hour. The cost of buying corn is used to value the corn used. 
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Table A-11. Combined income tax ratesa 
Taxable In come Income Tax Rate After Tax Income 
$ 7,058- 9,410 24.29% $ 5,343- 6,969 
$ 9 , 411-11, 763 25.93% $ 6,970- 8,559 
$11, 764-13,999 27 .23% $ 8,560-10,059 
$14 ,000-15,999 28.14% $10,060-11,417 
$16,000-17,999 28. 63% $11,418-12, 756 
$18,000-19 , 999 29.12% $12 ,757-14,040 
$20,000-21,999 29.79% $14,041-15,305 
$22,000-23,999 30. 42% $15 . 306-16 ,514 
8 Combined rate includes Federal and Iowa Income Taxes and Federal 
Self-Employment Tax. (50, pp. 54-55; 37, p. 11, 021; 18). 
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Table 12 . Income tax rates used 
Contract Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
1 30.42% 30 .42% 30.42% 30.42% 30 .42% 
2 28.63% 28 . 63% 29.12% 29.12% 29.12% 
3 25 .93% 2 7. 23% 28.14% 28.63% 29 .12% 
4 28 .63% 28.63% 28.63% 28 . 63% 28.63% 
5 2 7 . 23% 2 7 .23% 2 7 .23% 2 7 . 23% 2 7. 2 3% 
6 24.29% 25. 93% 25. 93% 25. 93% 27. 23% 
7 29 .12% 29.12% 29.12% 29.12% 29 .12% 
8 2 7 .23% 2 7. 23% 2 7 . 2 3% 2 7. 23% 28 . 14% 
9 24.29% 25.93% 25.93% 2 7. 2 3% 2 7 .23% 
10 28.63% 28.63% 28.63% 28 .63% 28.63% 
11 25 . 93% 25.93% 25. 93% 25 .93% 25.93% 
12 24.29% 24.29% 25. 93% 25.93% 25. 9 3% 
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Table A-13. Contract payments 
Year 2 Year 3 
Contract Principal Interest Principal Interest 
1 $10 '979 $10, 759 $10 ,979 $ 9,991 
2 6 ,816 10,759 7 ,293 10 ,282 
3 3,050 10,759 4 ,2 70 10,546 
4 7,685 10 '759 7 ,685 10,221 
5 3' 751 10 '759 4,013 10 ,497 
6 1,601 10 '759 2,241 10 ,64 7 
7 8,166 11,432 8,166 10,860 
8 3,984 11,432 4,263 11,153 
9 1,701 11,432 2,381 11, 313 
10 6 ,532 11, 432 6,532 10,974 
11 2 ,5 79 11,432 2 '760 11,251 
12 1,126 11,432 1,5 76 11,353 
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Table A-13. Continued. 
Year 4 Year 5 
Contract Principal Interest Principal Interest 
1 $10 ,979 $ 9,212 $10,979 $ 8,454 
2 7 , 803 9, 772 8 ,350 9,225 
3 5,490 10,246 6, 710 9 ,863 
4 7 ,685 9,583 7 ,685 9,145 
5 4,294 10 ,216 4,595 9,915 
6 2 ,882 10,490 3,522 10 ,289 
7 8,166 10,288 8,166 9 '717 
8 4 , 562 10,854 4,881 10 ,535 
9 3,062 11,146 3,742 10 ,931 
10 6 ,5 32 10,517 6 ,532 10,060 
11 2,953 11,058 3' 160 10' 851 
12 2 ,027 11,242 2 ,4 77 11, 101 
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Table A-14. Labor availability 
Month Period Hrs. per Days Total hrs. Overhead Net 
day available labor labor 
Dec . 1 8 26.6 212.8 25 187.8 
Jan. 1 8 26.6 212 . 8 25 187 .8 
Feb. 1 8 24.0 192.0 25 167 .o 
March 1 8 26 .6 212 .8 25 187.8 
Total 1 8 103. 8 830.4 100 730.4 
April 2 10 25 . 7 257 25. 232 
May 2 10 26.6 266 25 241 
June 2 10 25.7 257 25 232 
Total 2 10 78 780 75 705 
July 3 9 26.6 239 .4 25 214.4 
August 3 9 26.6 239.4 25 214.4 
Sept. 3 9 25.7 231 . 3 25 206.3 
Total 3 9 78.9 710.1 75 635 .1 
October 4 10 26.6 266 25 241 
November 4 10 25.7 257 25 232 
Total 4 10 52.3 523 50 473 
